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Abstract
We develop a model of interlocking bilateral relationships between upstream rms (man-
ufacturers) that produce di¤erentiated goods and downstream 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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study interlocking relationships in vertically related oligopolies, where the
same competing upstream rms deal with the same competing downstream rms. We develop
a framework that allows for general contracts between upstream and downstream rms, the
terms of which are private information to the contracting parties. In this framework, rms have
an incentive to sign exclusive dealing provisions or, alternatively, to integrate vertically, at the
expense of consumers and society. The contribution of this paper is thus two-fold: It provides a
general and yet tractable framework for the analysis of interlocking relationships; and it sheds
light on the long-standing policy debate on vertical foreclosure.
Interlocking relationships. In many if not most consumer goods markets, competing retailers
carry the products of the same competing national brand manufacturers. For example, most
supermarkets carry both Coca Cola and Pepsi Cola, and pay-TV operators o¤er access to the
channels of the same content providers.1 Such interlocking relationships are also endemic in
intermediate goods markets. For example, Airbus and Boeing procure components (e.g., avionics,
wheels and brakes) from the same competing suppliers (such as Honeywell and Thales); and
insurance companies often deal with the same health care service providers.2 Yet, despite their
prevalence in practice, there is little work on interlocking relationships in the literature.3 One
reason for this is that these relations are fraught with contracting externalities and therefore
di¢ cult to analyze. Indeed, the gains from trade that two rms can achieve together depend
not only on the agreement that they can reach, but also on the agreements that each can sign
with other partners, as well as on the agreements that these other partners can sign with each
other. In this paper, we develop a framework that fully accounts for these externalities and yet
provides clear predictions about likely outcomes, in terms of prices and outputs, distribution of
prots, and rmsincentives to opt for exclusivity or vertical integration.
Vertical foreclosure. It is widely recognized that exclusive dealing and vertical integration
can be motivated by e¢ ciency considerations. Whether rms can also engage in exclusive dealing
or merge vertically for anti-competitive purposes has been the object of a long-standing debate
1For an analysis of vertical relations in the U.S. cable TV industry, see, e.g., Chipty and Snyder (1999),
Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012), and Crawford, Lee, Whinston, and Yurukoglu (2015).
2For recent empirical studies of U.S. private health care markets, see, e.g., Gowrisankaran, Nevo, and Town
(2015) and Ho and Lee (2015).
3We discuss this literature, and how our paper relates to it, in Section 7.
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in policy circles as well as in the academic literature.4 The so-called Chicago critique pointed
out that the monopoly leverageconcept originally used was based on a confusion, as there is
only one source of prot in a vertically related industry. In response to this critique, Ordover,
Saloner and Salop (1990)5 showed that an integrated rm may stop supplying downstream ri-
vals, in order to confer market power to the other suppliers and raise in this way downstream
rivals costs. As noted by Hart and Tirole (1990) and Rei¤en (1992), however, this analysis
relied on the assumptions that (i) an integrated supplier could somehow pre-commit itself not
to supply downstream rivals (as ex post it would have an incentive to supply the rival), and
(ii) contracting with the other suppliers is ine¢ cient (linear tari¤s, giving rise to double mar-
ginalization). Hart and Tirole (1990), OBrien and Sha¤er (1992), and McAfee and Schwartz
(1994) emphasize instead that, under secret contracting, exclusive dealing or vertical integration
can help a dominant supplier exert its market power. While these papers are not subject to
the same limitations as Ordover, Salop and Saloner (1990), they restrict attention to upstream
monopoly or quasi-monopoly settings, which has severely limited their impact on actual policy
decisions. We contribute to this debate by showing the robustness of these previous insights to
more complex environments, which is important for competition authorities: not only in quasi-
monopoly settings but also in interlocking relationships with di¤erentiated products, rms can
have incentives to engage in vertical foreclosure in order to exert market power at the expense
of consumers and society. This is not to say that exclusive dealing or vertical integration is
necessarily bad for consumers or society. For the sake of exposition, we focus here on strategic
e¤ects, and abstract from well-known potential e¢ ciencies; in practice, competition agencies
may have to balance the pro- and anticompetitive e¤ects of these agreements.
Framework. We develop a rather general and yet tractable framework for the analysis of
multilateral vertical relationships. In particular, this framework allows for general (menus of)
non-linear tari¤s, fairly general demands for suppliersgoods, and arbitrary bargaining power
between upstream and downstream rms. A key ingredient is secret contracting: contracting
terms and acceptance decisions are assumed to be private information to the contracting par-
ties. We believe that this is a plausible assumption for many industries, in which rms are
actually keen to protect the condentiality of their agreements.6 This assumption also allows
4For reviews of this debate, see, e.g., Rey and Tirole (2007) and Whinston (2006).
5See also Salinger (1988).
6See Smith and Thanassoulis (2015) for evidence that supermarkets keep the contracts with their suppliers
secret.
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us to abstract from strategic pre-commitment e¤ects, in which rms distort the terms of their
agreements in order to inuence the behavior of their rivals.7
Contractual arrangements between upstream and downstream rms necessarily involve ex-
ternalities. Analyzing multilateral bargaining with externalities is complex, and the theory
literature has arguably not yet provided a widely accepted general solution. In light of this,
and for tractability, we consider a bargaining process in which, with some probability, either
the upstream rms get to make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to their downstream partners, or the
downstream rms are the ones to make the o¤ers.
Modelling secret contracting raises issues about rmsanticipations about other rmscon-
tracting arrangements. In particular, when receiving an unexpected o¤er from a trading partner,
a rm must form beliefs about the contracts that the partner is negotiating with the rms rivals.
The literature has mostly focused on simple or reasonable beliefs such as passive beliefs, where
recipients of unexpected o¤ers do not revise their beliefs about other rmscontracts, and wary
beliefs, where the receiver of a deviant o¤er assumes that the proposer o¤ers other partners
the best contract (from the proposers standpoint), given the contract o¤ered to the receiver.
The complexity of the issues raised by these out-of-equilibrium beliefs depends on the nature of
competition. For instance, even in the simple case where a single rm is present in the upstream
market, it is known that passive beliefs give rise to existence problems when the upstream rm
makes the o¤ers and downstream rms compete in prices, and wary beliefs are moreover not
very tractable in that case.8 By contrast, when downstream rms compete in quantities, wary
beliefs coincide with passive beliefs, and the analysis is also much more tractable.9 In the light of
these observations, in order to provide a general and yet tractable framework, it seems natural
to start with the case of Cournot competition among downstream rms. This is the route taken
in this paper.
Insights. We consider a successive duopoly setting in which upstream rms supply di¤erenti-
ated goods to downstream Cournot competitors. We provide mild regularity conditions ensuring
that, in the absence of any exclusive dealing or vertical integration, there exists a unique equi-
librium outcome in terms of downstream prices and quantities, which is independent of rms
bargaining power. By contrast, the division of prot depends not only on bargaining power
7These strategic e¤ects have for instance been analyzed by Bonanno and Vickers (1988), Rey and Stiglitz
(1988, 1995), Gal-Or (1991). For a review of this literature, see, e.g., Caillaud and Rey (1995).
8See Rey and Vergé (2004).
9See Hart and Tirole (1990).
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but also on the types of contracts signed in equilibrium. Upstream rms prefer the equilibrium
outcome induced by two-part tari¤s which is also the unique equilibrium outcome when below-
cost pricing is ruled out but downstream rms can obtain a larger share of the prot and
can even appropriate the entire prot with other non-linear contracts.
We also characterize the equilibria that arise under exclusive dealing and vertical integration.
Furthermore, we show that, regardless of rms relative bargaining power, and regardless of
which equilibrium is selected in the various situations, rms have an incentive to adopt exclusive
distribution provisions or to integrate vertically. By contrast, other exclusive deal arrangements,
such as single branding, are less attractive to the rms. Finally, we show that exclusive dealing
and vertical integration harm consumers and society.
Roadmap. Section 2 describes our framework. Section 3 establishes that contracts signed by
independent suppliers are bilaterally e¢ cient. Section 4 provides a complete characterization
of equilibria in the absence of exclusive dealing and vertical integration. Sections 5 and 6,
respectively, study exclusive dealing and vertical integration. Section 7 relates our paper to the
literature. Section 8 concludes.
2 The Framework
We consider a successive duopoly framework. For the sake of exposition, we will refer to the
upstream rms as manufacturers and to the downstream rms as retailers; it should however
be clear that the analysis can be transposed to other types of vertically related industries.
Specically, two di¤erentiated manufacturers, MA and MB, distribute their goods through two
retailers, R1 and R2, who compete à la Cournot in the downstream market. To focus on vertical
agreements, we rule out any kind of horizontalmechanisms such as, e.g., loyalty rebates or
Most Favored Nation provisions,10 and consider instead contracts purely based on the quantity
traded: Formally, a contract between Mi and Rh is a tari¤  ih : <+ ! <, where  ih(q) is the
payment from Rh to Mi in return for a quantity q of good i.11 We do not impose any further
10Loyalty rebatesare discounts based on market shares (e.g., conditional on the customer making at least x%
of its purchase from a given supplier). European antitrust authorities treat them as anti-competitive when they
are used by dominant suppliers. Most Favored Nation clauses require the supplier to grant the customer the
best conditions made to any other customer. They, too, have been subject to scrutiny by antitrust authorities.
11For the sake of exposition, we will assume that parties contract on the quantity q sold to consumers, rather
than the quantity bought from the manfacturer. The distinction becomes moot when the production cost is large
enough, as then a retailer will not want to buy more than it needs in any relevant scenario.
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restriction, however, and thus allow for any nonlinear tari¤; special cases of interest are:
 Two-part tari¤:  ih(q) = F +wq, where F is the xed (or franchise) fee, and w  0 the
marginal wholesale price; we will denote such a two-part tari¤ by (w;F ).
 Forcing contract:
 ih(q) =
8<: T^ if q = q^;1 otherwise,
where q^ is the forcedquantity; we will denote such a forcing contract by (q^; T^ ).
As discussed in the introduction, we assume that rms engage in secret bilateral negotiations.
Furthermore, to allow for balanced bargaining power, we assume further that both sides (man-
ufacturers or retailers) get to make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers with some probability. To maintain
symmetry in the resulting principal-agent relationship, we suppose that the receiving side then
picks the quantity to be traded.
The timing is as follows:
Stage 1 With probability  (resp., 1 ), manufacturers (resp., retailers) simultaneously o¤er
(secret) contracts to the retailers (resp., manufacturers).
Stage 2 The recipients of the o¤ers simultaneously (and secretly): (i) accept or reject the o¤ers;
and (ii) for each accepted contract, choose how much to put on the nal market.12 The
resulting prices are such that markets clear.
As is well-known, this type of game has many Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. This is because,
when a rm receives an unexpected (i.e., o¤-equilibrium) o¤er, there is considerable leeway in
how it might revise its beliefs about the o¤er made to its rival, and thus in how it will react to
the deviant o¤er. As argued by McAfee and Schwartz (1994), it is however natural to assume
that rms interpret any o¤er made as a deliberate choice by the proposer. This leads to focus
on wary beliefs, where the receiver of an unexpected o¤er thinks that the o¤er made to its
rival is the proposers optimal choice, given the o¤er just received.
Consider rst the case when manufacturers are the proposers. From the point of view of a
manufacturer, the two retailers form two completely separate markets in particular, because
12As acceptance and output decisions are simultaneous, there is no role here for menus of contracts: O¤ering a
menu of tari¤s is de facto equivalent to o¤ering the envelope of these tari¤s (the lower envelope if manufacturers
are the proposers, or the upper one, if retailers are the proposers). It will however be sometimes convenient to
refer to menus of forcing contracts.
5
contract o¤ers are secret, each retailers willingness to pay does not depend on the contract
actually o¤ered to its rival. Thus a manufacturer has no incentive to change its o¤er to one
retailer when it alters the other retailers contract. As a result, wary beliefs coincide with
so-called passiveor market-by-market-bargainingconjectures: retailers do not revise their
expectations about the other contracts when they receive a deviant o¤er.
Consider now the case when retailers are the proposers. As the manufacturersgoods are (pos-
sibly imperfect) substitutes, the quantity that a retailer wishes to trade with one manufacturer
typically depends on the quantity traded with the other manufacturer. Hence, a manufacturer
should anticipate that, if a retailer o¤ers it an out-of-equilibrium contract, the latter has an
incentive to change the terms o¤ered to the other manufacturer. However, for an independent
manufacturer, the prot obtained by dealing with one retailer does not depend on the terms of
trade with the other retailer, and thus the issue of out-of-equilibrium beliefs becomes moot.13
By contrast, an integrated manufacturer worries about the impact on its downstream subsidiary,
and as a result wary beliefs no longer coincide with passive beliefs, as the quantity that a retailer
wishes to trade with one manufacturer typically depends on the quantity traded with the other
manufacturer.
We will consider variants of the above baseline model in which the rms can either engage
in exclusive dealing or vertical integration. An exclusive dealing provision restricts the set of
partners to whom o¤ers can be made or from whom they can be accepted. In case Mi and Rh
are vertically integrated, we assume that they maximize their joint prots, regardless of internal
transfer prices; in addition, Mi and Rh share informationin the sense that, when making an
acceptance or output decision, the integrated rm knows the terms of the o¤er made by its own
subsidiary to the rival.14
For expositional simplicity, we assume that manufacturers are symmetric and that retailers
are perfect substitutes. Specically, each manufacturer Mi, for i 2 fA;Bg, produces good i
13When the manufacturer is indi¤erent between supplying di¤erent quantities to a given retailer, this choice
could in theory depend on the contract o¤ered by the other retailer. This, in turn, could be used to punish
deviations by the other retailer. We will discard such possibility and assume that the quantity supplied by the
manufacturer to a given retailer depends only on the agreement reached with that retailer. [Introducing arbitrarily
small shocks to manufacturerscosts, not observed by retailers, would su¢ ce to solve this issue, as manufacturers
could no longer be made indi¤erent between alternative options.]
14As we assume that acceptance and output decisions are made simultaneously, we do not need to take a stance
on how an integrated rm would interpret an unexpected acceptance or rejection of the o¤er made by its own
subsidiary.
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at the same constant unit cost c > 0, and the two retailers face the same constant unit cost,
which for convenience we normalize to zero. The inverse demand for good i = A;B is given
by P (Qi; Qj), j 6= i 2 fA;Bg, where Qi  qi1 + qi2 denotes total consumption of good i, and
qih  0 the quantity of good i purchased from retailer Rh, h 2 f1; 2g.Total industry prot is
therefore given by:
 (QA; QB)  [P (QA; QB)  c]QA + [P (QB; QA)  c]QB;
and the prot generated by Rh can be expressed as, for h 6= k 2 f1; 2g:
h (qAh; qBh; qAk; qBk)  [P (QA; QB)  c] qAh + [P (QB; QA)  c] qBh:
Throughout the paper, we assume that goods A and B are (imperfect) substitutes, and that
there is a viable demand for each unless the other one oods the market:
(A:1) For any (QA; QB)  0,15
@1P (QA; QB)  @2P (QA; QB)  0;
with strict inequalities when P (QA; QB) > 0.
(A:2) P (0; 0) > c and, for Q su¢ ciently large, P (0; Q) < c.
3 Cost-based Contracts
In this section, we dene the notion of a cost-based contract, in which the marginal input
price coincides with the marginal cost of production, and show that unintegrated manufacturers
sign cost-based contracts with every available retailer.
Throughout the paper, we will use indices i 6= j when referring to MA and MB, and h 6=
k when referring to R1 and R2. Let
 (qik; qjh; qjk)  arg max
qih
[P (qi1 + qi2; qj1 + qj2)  c] qih + P (qj1 + qj2; qi1 + qi2) qjh
denote the set of bilaterally e¢ cient values for the output qih, from the standpoint of the pair
Mi  Rh, holding xed all other outputs.16 We will say that the equilibrium contract signed by
Mi and Rh is cost-basedif it induces a bilaterally e¢ cient output, given the other outputs:
15Throughout the paper, @nf denotes the partial derivative of the function f with respect to its nth argument;
likewise, @2nmf will denote the second-order partial derivative with respect to the n
th and mth arguments.
16 In the above equation, the right-hand side constitutes the joint prot of Mi and Rh, gross of Mis prot from
dealing with Rk,  ik (qik)  cqik, and of Rhs payment for qjh,  jh (qjh).
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Denition 1 Given the outputs of the other channels (qik; qjh; qjh), a contract  ih() between
Mi and Rh is said to be cost-based if, when accepted, it induces a quantity qih 2  (qik; qjh; qjh).
The following lemma shows that in equilibrium, unintegrated manufacturers sign cost-based
contracts:
Lemma 1 Suppose Mi is not vertically integrated (whereas Mj may or may not be vertically
integrated). Then, in any equilibrium Mi signs a cost-based contract (as dened above) with
every retailer Rh that is available,17 given the exclusive dealing provisions (with the convention
that they sign a null contract if it is bilaterally e¢ cient not to trade). In addition, when
the retailers are the proposers, then Mi supplies the equilibrium quantities at cost (that is, Mi
obtains zero prot).
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition is the following. When the retailers are the proposers, an independent Mi is
actually willing to supply any retailer with any quantity in return for any payment covering
its cost; as a result, retailers ask for the bilaterally e¢ cient quantity, and just cover the cost.
When instead the manufacturers are the proposers, the contract that an independent Mi signs
with one retailer does not a¤ect the prot that Mi can make with the other retailer. As a
result, wary beliefs boil down to passive beliefs: Each Rh expects its rival Rk to stick to the
equilibrium quantities even when receiving a deviant o¤er from Mi. As the deviant o¤er does
not a¤ect the prot that Mi makes on its contract with Rk, the equilibrium contract between
Mi and Rh must therefore maximize the joint bilateral prot of the contracting parties, given
Rks equilibrium quantities, which is achieved by signing a cost-based contract. Note that this
logic holds regardless of whether the other contracts are cost-based or not.
As we show below, an important implication of Lemma 1 is that the equilibria replicate the
outcome of di¤erentiated-goods Cournot duopolies. Specically, consider the following settings,
in which two rms can produce goods A and/or B at the same constant unit cost c:
 Multiproduct-rm Cournot duopoly : Both rms can produce goods A and B.
 Asymmetric Cournot duopoly : One rm can produce both goods, whereas the other rm
can produce only one good.
17That is, the contract between Mi and Rh induces the bilaterally e¢ cient output qih, given the equilibrium
outputs of the other channels.
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 Di¤erentiated monoproduct-rm Cournot duopoly : One rm can produce good A and the
other can produce B.
For the sake of exposition, we will assume that these duopoly settings yield a well-behaved
outcome, namely:
(P:1) In each of these settings, there is a unique equilibrium, in which all quantities are pos-
itive; in addition, whenever a rm sells both goods, the goods are internal strategic
substitutes.18
Property (P:1) ensures that the equilibrium outcomes vary across the di¤erent duopoly
settings. In particular, a rm sells every good that it can produce but, holding xed the rivals
outputs, wants to sell less of a good the more it produces of the other one. Property (P:1)
holds, for instance, when demand is linear; in the Online Appendix A, we provide more general
conditions on demand ensuring that (P:1) holds. In what follows, we assume that (P:1) holds.
In the multiproduct-rm Cournot duopoly, rms are symmetric; the uniqueness of the equi-
librium thus implies that it is symmetric: each rm sells a quantity q > 0 of each good, where
q is such that
q 2 arg max
q
[P (q + q; 2q)  c] q + [P (2q; q + q)  c] q:
Total industry prot is positive19 and equal to
   (2q; 2q) = [P (2q; 2q)  c] 4q > 0:
Consider now an asymmetric Cournot duopoly where rm 1, say, o¤ers both goods A and
B, whereas rm 2 o¤ers good B only. The equilibrium quantities are then such that
(qA1; q

B1) 2 arg maxqA1;qB1 [P (qA1; qB1 + q

B2)  c] qA1 + [P (qB1 + qB2; qA1)  c] qB1;
qB2 2 arg maxqB2 [P (q

B1 + qB2; q

A1)  c] qB2:
18That is, the prot  of a rm, as a function of its quantities qA and qB , is such that @2=@qA@qB  0, with
a strict inequality whenever the price of at least one good is positive.
19By construction, equilibrium prots cannot be negative. Furthermore, starting from a candidate equilibrium
in which prots would be zero, each rm would benet from slightly reducing any of its outputs. A similar
argument applies to the other duopoly settings in the asymmetric case, it can further be shown that both prices
must be above costs.
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Total industry prot is thus equal to  = 1 +2, where (with QA = q

A1 and Q

B = q

B1 +q

B2)
1 = [P (Q

A; Q

B)  c] qA1 + [P (QB; QA)  c] qB1 > 0 and 2 = [P (QB; QA)  c] qB2 > 0:
Finally, in the di¤erentiated monoproduct-rm Cournot duopoly, rms are again symmetric
and thus the uniqueness of the equilibrium implies that it is symmetric: each rm sells a quantity
Q of its good, where Q > 0 is the unique solution to
Q 2 arg max
Q
[P (Q;Q)  c]Q:
Total industry prot is equal to
 =  (Q; Q) = [P (Q; Q)  c] 2Q > 0:
4 Non-Exclusive Relationships and Vertical Separation
We now characterize the equilibria in the absence of exclusive dealing and vertical integration.
The following proposition shows that all equilibria entail the same downstream prices and quan-
tities and thus generate the same industry prot; however, they can di¤er in the way rms
share this prot manufacturers cannot get more, but may get less than their contribution to
this industry prot:
Proposition 1 In the absence of exclusive dealing and vertical integration, the set of equilibria
is non-empty and characterized as follows:
(i) The quantities (qih)i=A;B;h=1;2 are the same as in the multiproduct-rm Cournot duopoly:
qih = q
.
(ii) The range of expected prots for the two manufacturers is [0; 2] [0; 2], where
  

2
 max
q
f[P (q + q; q)  c] qg
denotes the manufacturers contribution to the prot =2 generated by a retailer.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The intuition for the rst part is simple. From Lemma 1, each Mi must sign a cost-based
contract with each Rh. This, in turn, implies that the equilibrium replicates the outcome of a
multiproduct-rm Cournot duopoly.
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All equilibria thus generate the same industry-wide aggregate prot, . Furthermore, when
the retailers are the proposers, then from Lemma 1 manufacturers supply at cost, and thus the
equilibrium outcome is unique: manufacturers obtain zero prot, and each retailer appropriates
the prot that it generates. In Appendix B, it is moreover shown that this outcome can be
supported in various ways. For instance, retailers could o¤er to buy any quantity at cost;
alternatively, each retailer could o¤er each manufacturer a single forcing contract (q; cq).
When instead the manufacturers are the proposers, every equilibrium tari¤ must o¤er more
exibility than a single forcing contract. The intuition is as follows. In equilibrium, each retailer
must be indi¤erent between accepting both manufacturerso¤ers, or only one (either one): If a
retailer strictly preferred dealing with both manufacturers than with only one of them, then the
rival manufacturer could protably deviate by asking for a larger share of the prots. But if, say,
Mi o¤ers Rh a single forcing contract (q; T ih), then Mi is also indi¤erent between whether or
not Rh also accepts upstream rival Mjs o¤er; hence, the joint prot of Mi and Rh must be the
same as what they would obtain if Rh were to deal exclusively withMi, namely, P (2q; q) T ih.
Hence, in equilibrium the sum of Rhs prot and ofMis prot from its contract with Rh is given
by
(T ih   cq) + (P (2q; q)  T ih) = [P (2q; q)  c] q:
It follows that, under exclusivity, Mi and Rh could generate more prot by replacing q with
q^  arg max
q
f[P (q + q; q)  c] qg ;
and share the prot increase through an appropriate transfer T^ ; that is, Mi could protably
deviate by o¤ering the forcing contract

q^; T^

, thereby inducing Rh to bumpthe rival man-
ufacturer (note that this deviation does not a¤ect the prot that Mi obtains from dealing with
the other retailer, Rk).20
Two-part tari¤s, for instance, o¤er the desired exibility, and they can be used to support
an equilibrium in which manufacturers obtain their full contribution to industry prots, . To
see why, note rst that cost-based two-part tari¤s allow retailers to buy any marginal quantity
at cost. It follows that: (i) as a manufacturer does not care about the level of trade chosen by
20A similar bumping problem arises in a setting considered by Marx and Sha¤er (2007), where two retailers are
each o¤ering a single (public) contract to a common manufacturer. As a result, the weaker retailer is excluded in
equilibrium. Allowing retailers to o¤er menus of contracts (one explicitly or even implicitly designed for exclusivity,
and one designed for non-exclusivity), restores the existence of an equilibrium where both channels are active; see
Miklós-Thal et al. (2011) and Rey and Whinston (2013).
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retailers, it is indi¤erent as to whether retailers will deal with the rival manufacturer or not; and
(ii) in both instances, the tari¤ is bilaterally e¢ cient, that is, it maximizes the joint prot of
the manufacturer and the retailer. Second, setting the equilibrium xed fees to  makes each
retailer indi¤erent between dealing with both manufacturers, or with either one on an exclusivity
basis. It follows that manufacturers cannot protably deviate, as they cannot increase the joint
prot achieved with a retailer (regardless of whether the deviant o¤er induces exclusivity or not)
and cannot decrease the prot of the retailer (who can always obtain its equilibrium prot by
dealing exclusively with the rival).
The rst part of Proposition 1 implies that the equilibrium industry prot is also the same
as in the multiproduct-rm Cournot duopoly: each retailer generates a prot equal to .
Furthermore, even when it can make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers, a manufacturer cannot ask for
more than its contribution  to this prot in equilibrium, otherwise its rival could protably
deviate by inducing the retailer to opt for exclusivity. However, as is usual in these common
agency situations, the more generous a manufacturer is, the more generous the other must
be; as a result, there are innitely many equilibria, in which manufacturers obtain less than
their contribution to the industry prot; in particular, there are equilibria in which retailers
appropriate all prots.
O¤ering a pair of forcing contracts su¢ ces to provide the exibility needed to sustain any
of these equilibrium outcomes: it is shown in Appendix B that, without loss of generality, we
can indeed restrict attention to equilibria in which each Mi o¤ers each Rh two forcing con-
tracts: a cost-based contract (q; T ih) designed for common agency, which Rh accepts along
the equilibrium path, and a contract

~qih; ~T

ih

designed for exclusivity, where ~qih > q
 and
c (~qih   q)  ~T ih   T ih > 0. Even though they are not accepted in equilibrium, the exclusive
dealo¤ers determine retailersoutside options, and thus how much prot is left for the manufac-
turers: in equilibrium, each retailer is indi¤erent between picking both (q; T Ah) and (q
; T Bh),
or picking only

~qih; ~T

ih

, from either manufacturer i = A;B. Moreover, each manufacturer
must (weakly) prefer that the retailer does not choose the exclusive deal o¤er but rather the one
designed for common agency: if a manufacturer were to prefer the retailer to accept the exclusive
deal option over the common agency option, then the manufacturer could protably deviate by
making the exclusive deal option slightly more attractive, thereby inducing the retailer to pick
that option. By contrast, it may be the case that a manufacturer would be strictly worse-o¤ if a
retailer were to select it on an exclusive basis; indeed, to sustain an equilibrium that gives some
manufacturer Mi less than its contribution  to the prot generated by some retailer Rh, the
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other manufacturer, Mj , must price the incremental quantity ~qjh   q below cost.21
5 Exclusive Dealing
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of exclusive dealing provisions on the equilibrium outcome
and on welfare. These provisions include exclusive distribution contracts, which preclude the
manufacturer from selling to the rival retailer, and single branding contracts, which preclude
the retailer from buying from the other manufacturer. We rst consider the case where an
exclusive dealing provision precludes trade between, say, MA and R2, and then the case where
two exclusive dealing provisions preclude trade, e.g., between MA and R2 and between MB
and R1. We then study rmsincentives to engage in exclusive dealing and nally consider the
welfare implications.
5.1 Equilibrium Outcomes
 Single exclusivity. We begin by analyzing the equilibrium e¤ects of a pre-existing exclusion
dealing provision that precludes trade between, say, MA and R2. Such a provision could, for
instance, be an exclusive distribution contract betweenMA and R1, or a single branding contract
between MB and R2. We have:
Proposition 2 Suppose that a single exclusive dealing provision precludes trade between, say,
MA and R2 (i.e., qA2 = 0). The set of equilibria is then non-empty and characterized as follows:
(i) The quantities (qA1; q

B1; q

B2) are the same as in the corresponding asymmetric Cournot
duopoly.
(ii) The range of expected prots forMA andMB is
h
0; A;1
i

h
2; 

2 + B;1
i
, where:
A;1 = 

1  maxqB1 f[P (qB1 + q

B2; 0)  c] qB1g ;
and
B;1 = 

1  maxqA1 f[P (qA1; q

B2)  c] qA1g
respectively denote MAs and MBs contributions to the prot generated by R1.
21By contrast, the equilibrium based on two-part tari¤s, which gives both manufacturers their contribution
, is by construction such that each Mi is indi¤erent between Rh buying q from both manufacturers, or ~qih
exclusively from Mi. This equilibrium is therefore truthful in the spirit of Bernheim and Whinston (1986a).
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Proof. See Appendix C.
The rst part of Proposition 2 follows from Lemma 1: As contracts must be cost-based, the
market outcome is the same as in an asymmetric duopoly in which one rm o¤ers both goods A
and B, whereas the other o¤ers only one of these goods. The second part of Proposition 2 follows
the same logic as that of Proposition 1. In particular, when retailers are the proposers, they
buy the bilaterally e¢ cient quantity at cost. When instead the manufacturers are the proposers,
R1 is again indi¤erent between accepting both manufacturerso¤ers, or only one (either one),
and manufacturers cannot obtain more than their contribution to the prot 1 generated by
R1; they may however obtain less than their contribution, as manufacturers must match each
others generosity. By contrast, as MB is now the sole supplier of R2, it can appropriate all the
prot 2 generated by R2. Note however that, while MB obtains all of 2, MA can obtain a
larger share of 1 than MB, as A;1 > 

B;1 > 0.
22
 Pairwise exclusivity. Suppose now that (pre-existing) pairwise exclusive dealing provisions
preclude trade between MA and R2 as well as between MB and R1. For example, MA and R1
as well as MB and R2 may have signed exclusive distribution contracts with each other, or MA
and R2 as well as MB and R1 may have signed single branding contracts. We have:
Proposition 3 Suppose that pairwise exclusive dealing provisions preclude trade between, say,
MA and R2 as well as between MB and R1 (i.e., qA2 = q

B1 = 0). Then, there exists a unique
equilibrium, characterized as follows:
(i) The quantities (qA1; q

B2) are the same as in the di¤erentiated monoproduct-rm Cournot
duopoly: qA1 = q

B2 = Q
.
(ii) Each manufacturers expected prot is equal to =2.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The market outcome is thus that of a di¤erentiated duopoly, with one rm o¤ering good
A and the other o¤ering good B. This equilibrium outcome can be supported by cost-based
22That MBs contribution is positive stems from qB1 > 0, which implies
1 = max
qA1;qB1
f[P (qA1; qB1 + qB2)  c] qA1 + [P (qB1 + qB2; qA1)  c] qB1g
> max
qA1
f[P (qA1; qB2)  c] qA1g :
That MAs contribution is larger than MBs follows from the fact that, from (A:1), P (q; qB2) > P (q + q

B2; 0)
for any q such that P (q; qB2) > 0.
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two-part tari¤s. However, in contrast to the previous cases, it could be supported as well by
manufacturers each o¤ering a single forcing contract. Furthermore, equilibrium prots are here
unique as well, as proposers always appropriate all the prots generated by their channels.
5.2 Adoption of Exclusive Dealing Provisions
To analyze rmsincentives to engage in exclusive dealing, we rst discuss the impact of exclusive
dealing on rmsprots, and then consider a simple game where rms decide whether to sign
exclusivity provisions. We will henceforth assume the following:
(P:2) Comparing the three Cournot duopoly settings introduced in Section 3, total industry
prot is higher when a good is produced by a single rm than when it is produced by both
rms:  >  > . In addition: (i) output levels are higher when both rms carry both
goods than when they both carry a single good: Q < Q; and (ii) a monoproduct rm
sells less when its rival produces both goods (asymmetric duopoly) than when it produces
a single good (di¤erentiated monoproduct-rm duopoly).
Property (P:2) asserts that intrabrand competition tends to dissipate prots; as a result,
compared with the di¤erentiated monoproduct-rm duopoly setting where each good is produced
by a single rm, total industry prot is lower when one good is sold by both rms (asymmetric
duopoly), and even more so when both rms produce both goods (multiproduct-rm duopoly).
In the Online Appendix B we provide general conditions ensuring that Property (P:2) holds.
This property allows us to provide the following comparative statics:
Proposition 4 We have:
(i) In any equilibrium that arises in the absence of exclusivity, at least one manufacturer-
retailer pair Mi  Rh obtains a lower joint prot than in any equilibrium that arises when
Mi deals exclusively with Rh, regardless of whether the rival manufacturer Mj deals with
both retailers (i.e., under single exclusivity), or exclusively with the rival retailer Rk (i.e.,
under pairwise exclusivity).
(ii) In any equilibrium that arises under single exclusivity, the joint prot of the manufacturer-
retailer pair that engages in exclusive distribution is higher, and the joint prot of the other
pair is lower, than in the unique equilibrium that arises under pairwise exclusivity.
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Proof. See Appendix E.
These prot comparisons build on two intuitive insights. First, industry prots are larger
under pairwise exclusivity than under any other conguration; this derives from the fact that,
under pairwise exclusivity, each good is sold only by a single rm; by contrast, in all other
situations at least one good is sold by more than one rm, which further intensies competition
by creating intrabrand as well as interbrand competition.
Second, a manufacturer-retailer pair obtains a larger joint prot when it is the only pair that
engages in exclusive distribution, than under pairwise exclusive dealing. This follows from the
fact that, under single exclusivity, the manufacturer-retailer pair that has signed an exclusive
distribution agreement must at least obtain what it could jointly achieve if the retailer were
to deviate and drop the rival brand, leading to a situation where each good is sold by a single
rm, but in which the deviating retailer would moreover face a less aggressive rival than in the
pairwise exclusive dealing equilibrium.23
Proposition 4 implies that, starting from a situation without any exclusivity, at least one
manufacturer-retailer pair would benet from signing an exclusive distribution contract (whether
or not the other pair does the same). Furthermore, if one pair signs an exclusive distribution
agreement, then the other pair benets from doing the same, at the expense of the rst pair.
To analyze further rms incentives to adopt exclusivity provisions, consider the following
adoption game:24
 Stage 1: One manufacturer, say Mi, and one retailer, say Rh, get the opportunity to
negotiate an exclusive deal:
With probability , Mi can propose exclusive dealing provisions, namely exclusive
distribution and/or single branding agreements, together with a lump-sum transfer;
Rh can then accept or reject the o¤er.
With probability 1   , Rh can make such an o¤er, which Mi can then accept or
reject.
 Stage 2: The two rivals, Mj and Rk (with j 6= i 2 fA;Bg and k 6= h 2 f1; 2g), get a
similar opportunity.
23 If, for instance, MA and R1 sign an exclusive distribution agreement, then R2 sells more of good B under
pairwise exclusivity, where it expects to be the sole distributor of that good, than under single exclusivity, where
R1, too, sells good B; hence, qB2 < q

B2.
24The payo¤s of the game are those in the induced equilibrium of the model in Section 2.
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The following proposition conrms the previous insights:
Proposition 5 The above adoption game has a subgame perfect equilibrium, and all subgame
perfect equilibria yield pairwise exclusivity.
Proof. See Appendix F.
What is remarkable about Proposition 5 is that its conclusion depends neither on rms
bargaining power (as captured by the parameters  and ), nor on equilibrium selection (that
is, on how prots are shared in the absence of exclusivity, or under single exclusivity).
The intuition is as follows. As noted above, industry prot is maximal under pairwise ex-
clusivity, which removes any intrabrand competition. Furthermore, from Proposition 4, under
single exclusive dealing, the manufacturer-retailer pair that has signed an exclusive distribution
agreement obtains a larger joint prot than the other pair. Therefore, in any equilibrium, either
the rst pair adopts both exclusive distribution and single branding provisions, or each pair
successively signs an exclusive distribution agreement.
To conclude this discussion, we rst note that the above insights carry over as long as
exclusive distribution agreements are available, regardless of whether single branding provisions
are also available. In equilibrium, the rst pair then signs an exclusive distribution agreement,
which induces the other pair to do the same.25
By contrast, the incentives to opt for exclusivity are less clear when only single branding
provisions are available. Indeed, if one manufacturer-retailer pair, say Mj   Rk, has already
opted for single branding, then the other pair, Mi   Rh, will not follow suit: As we have seen,
Mi and Rhs joint prot is larger in the single exclusive dealing situation where Mi does not
deal with Rk, than in case of pairwise exclusivity. Consider now a situation without exclusivity,
and suppose thatMj and Rk sign a single branding contract that prevents Rk from dealing with
the rival manufacturer Mi. Intuitively, this eliminates intrabrand competition for good A, and
may thereby increase total industry prot. However, the above analysis reveals that the other
manufacturer-retailer pair, say Mi Rh, gets the bigger share of that prot; hence, even if total
industry prot is increased, Mj and Rh may obtain too small a share of that bigger pie, making
single branding unprotable. Indeed, in the linear demand example considered at the end of
Section 5.3, starting from a situation without exclusivity where the manufacturer-retailer pairs
Mi Rh and Mj  Rk share the industry prot equally, then none of them can increase its joint
25An alternative equilibrium, inducing the same outcome, has the rst pair entering into both exclusive distri-
bution and single-branding, thereby unilaterally imposing pairwise exclusivity.
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prot by opting for single branding; in the same vein, Mj and Rk cannot benet from signing a
single branding contract if this does not allow Mj to extract more prot from the other retailer,
Rh (i.e., if j;h  j;h).
Finally, we note that exclusivity would likely to be less attractive if retailers were di¤eren-
tiated. In that case, the adoption of exclusive dealing provisions would involve a trade-o¤: on
the one hand, they would eliminate intrabrand competition, enabling rms to maintain higher
prices; on the other hand, they would limit the volume of sales, for any given prices. The more
di¤erentiated the retailers would be, the more important the latter e¤ect would be, making
exclusive dealing less appealing.26
5.3 Welfare E¤ects of Exclusive Dealing
We now turn to the welfare e¤ects of exclusive dealing. For given quantities QA and QB,
consumer surplus can be expressed as
S (QA; QB)  U (QA; QB)  P (QA; QB)QA   P (QB; QA)QB;
where
U (QA; QB) 
Z QA
0
P (qA; QB)dqA +
Z QB
0
P (qB; 0)dqB;
and social welfare can be expressed as
W (QA; QB) 
Z QA
0
[P (qA; QB)  c] dqA +
Z QB
0
[P (qB; 0)  c] dqB:
We rst show that pairwise exclusive dealing increases prots at the expense of consumer
surplus and social welfare:
Proposition 6 Consumer surplus and social welfare are lower under pairwise exclusivity than in
the absence of any exclusive dealing: S(Q; Q) < S(Q; Q) and W (Q; Q) < W (Q; Q).
Proof. See Appendix G.
The intuition is straightforward. Exclusive dealing reduces the number of retailers selling any
given good, leading to less intense competition, lower outputs and higher prices. This increases
26We would expect exclusive dealing to remain attractive when retailers are close substitutes. By contrast, in
the polar case where retailers are fully di¤erentiated (i.e., local monopolies), industry prot is maximal when all
channels are active (and retailers act as common agents for the manufacturers), and there is clearly no scope
for exclusivity.
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rmsprots (as output levels remain above monopoly levels), but obviously harms consumers
and reduces total welfare (as prices move further away from marginal cost).
We now show that, under reasonable assumptions, similar insights apply when a single
exclusive dealing provision prevents one retailer from distributing one of the goods. To introduce
these assumptions, consider a hypothetical duopoly setting, in which rm 1, say, produces both
goods at cost c, whereas the other rm produces one good good A, say at cost c^  c, and
the other good at cost c. For rm 1, maximizing its prot, i.e.,
max
qA1;qB1
[P (QA; QB)  c] qA1 + [P (QB; QA)  c] qB1
leads to the following rst-order conditions:
P (QA; QB)  c+ @1P (QA; QB) qA1 + @2P (QB; QA) qB1 = 0; (1)
P (QB; QA)  c+ @1P (QB; QA) qB1 + @2P (QA; QB) qA1 = 0: (2)
Likewise, for rm 2,
max
qA2;qB2
[P (QA; QB)  c^] qA2 + [P (QB; QA)  c] qB2
leads to:
P (QA; QB)  c^+ @1P (QA; QB) qA2 + @2P (QB; QA) qB2 = 0; (3)
P (QB; QA)  c+ @1P (QB; QA) qB2 + @2P (QA; QB) qA2 = 0: (4)
Adding-up (1) and (3), and doing the same with (2) and (4), yields:
2P (QA; QB)  c  c^+ @1P (QA; QB)QA + @2P (QB; QA)QB = 0;
2P (QB; QA)  2c+ @1P (QB; QA)QB + @2P (QA; QB)QA = 0:
The rst condition can be interpreted as characterizing the aggregate best-responseQA =
R^ (QB; c^), which determines how much of good A is produced, for a given aggregate quantity of
good B; likewise, the second condition characterizes the aggregate best-response QB = R (QA).
We will assume that this hypothetical duopoly game has a well-behaved equilibrium, namely:
(B) For any Q > 0,  1 < R0 (Q)  0, with a strict inequality when R (Q) > 0,  1 <
@1R^ (Q; c^)  0; and @2R^ (Q; c^)  0, with strict inequalities when R^ (Q; c^) > 0.
The rst part of this assumption amounts to asserting that aggregate quantities are strategic
substitutes, and that the resulting equilibrium is unique and stable;27 the second part simply
27That is, a standard tâtonnement process would converge towards the equilibrium.
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asserts that an increase in the cost of a good leads to a reduction in the aggregate production
of that good. These properties are satised for instance when demand is linear; in the Online
Appendix C, we provide more general conditions on demand ensuring that Assumption (B)
holds. We have:
Proposition 7 Consumer surplus and social welfare are lower under single exclusivity than in
the absence of any exclusive dealing.
Proof. See Appendix H.
Intuitively, we would moreover expect the impact of exclusivity to be more important when
goods A and B are more di¤erentiated. Indeed, exclusive dealing has no e¤ect in the limit case of
perfect substitutes (as, in that case, the retailers do not care about whether they sell one good
or both of them), and enables instead rms to achieve the industry-wide monopoly outcome
when goods A and B face independent demands. To illustrate this, consider the case of linear
demand:
P (QA; QB) = 1  QA + sQB
1 + s
;
where s reects the degree of substitution between A and B, and ranges from s = 0 (independent
demands) to s = 1 (perfect substitutes). Normalizing the production cost to c  0, we have:
Q = q =
1 + s
2 + s
 Q = 2q = 2
3
;
p = P (Q; Q) =
1
2 + s
 p = P (Q; Q) = 1
3
;
with strict inequalities whenever s < 1. Hence, not only does pairwise exclusivity reduce output
and raise prices, but the impact is greater when the goods A and B are more di¤erentiated:
The demand is here normalized so as to be independent of the di¤erentiation parameter s in
symmetric congurations,28 and neither Q nor p depend on s either; yet, Q decreases, and
p increases, as s decreases.
Intuitively, we would also expect each exclusive dealing provision to contribute to increasing
prot, at the expense of consumers and allocative e¢ ciency. This is indeed the case in the above
linear model. When a single exclusive dealing provision precludes trade between MA and R2,
28That is, P (Q;Q) = 1   Q and thus remains constant (for symmetric congurations) when the degree of
product di¤erentiation varies. In particular, the benchmark monopoly quantity, QM = 1=2, is independent of s.
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the equilibrium prices and quantities are uniquely dened and given by:
qA1 =
1
2
< Q =
2
3
; qB1 =
2  s
6
< q =
1
3
< qB2 =
1 + s
3
;
QA =
1
2
< Q =
2
3
< QB =
4 + s
6
;
p =
1
2 + s
> pA =
1
2
  s
6
> pB = p
 =
1
3
:
That is, starting from the baseline scenario with no exclusivity, shutting down the channel
MA R2 induces R1 to sell more of good A, but not so much as to compensate for R2s lost sales
of good A; this also induces R2 to sell more of good B, a move partially o¤set by R1 reducing its
own sales of that good (both because it faces a more aggressive rival R2 for good B, and because
R1 itself sells more of the substitute good A). As one price increases, the other one remaining
constant, consumer surplus and social welfare decrease, whereas industry prot increases.
It can be checked that each exclusivity provision increases industry prot, and reduces both
consumer surplus and social welfare:
 = 2pQ = 2
1 + s
(2 + s)2
>  = pAQ

A + p

BQ

B =
17  s
36
>  = 2pQ =
4
9
;
S = S (Q; Q) =
(1 + s)2
(2 + s)2
< S = S (QA; Q

B) =
25 + 7s
72
< S = S (Q; Q) =
4
9
;
W  = S +  =
3 + 4s+ s2
(s+ 2)2
< W  =  + S =
59 + 5s
72
< W  = S +  =
8
9
:
This is illustrated by Figure 1, which shows furthermore that the impact of each exclusivity
provision is also larger when the goods are more di¤erentiated: The top curves depict the
industry prot and the bottom ones depict consumer surplus, as a function of the substitution
parameter s; the bold line represents the non-exclusivity benchmark, whereas the dashed curves
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correspond to single exclusivity, and the solid curves to pairwise exclusivity.
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Figure 1: Prot and consumer surplus for a linear demand.
6 Vertical Integration
In this section, we analyze the positive and normative e¤ects of vertical integration. We begin by
considering the case of two vertically integrated rms (pairwise vertical integration), and then
turn to the case where one vertically integrated rm faces independent rivals (single vertical in-
tegration). We show that, under mild regularity conditions, pairwise vertical integration yields
a unique equilibrium, in which each vertically integrated rm forecloses its rival; the equilibrium
outcome thus replicates (in terms of retail prices and quantities) that of pairwise exclusivity. Un-
der single vertical integration, there exists an equilibrium in which the integrated rm forecloses
its downstream rival, thus replicating the outcome of single exclusive dealing. That is, a vertical
merger leads to the foreclosure of the rival retailer. The welfare analysis of vertical integration
therefore mirrors that of exclusive dealing: vertical integration reduces both consumer surplus
and social welfare.
To state our regularity conditions, we rst make an excursion and introduce a related duopoly
game.
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6.1 Excursion: Related Duopoly Game
Consider the following hypothetical duopoly game, denoted  . Two rms, 1 and 2; o¤er two
goods, A and B. Firm 1 chooses its quantity qA1 of good A while rm 2 chooses its quantity
qB2 of good B. In addition, rm 1 sells an exogenous quantity q^B1 of good B and rm 2 an
exogenous quantity q^A2 of good A, so that the prot functions of the two rms are given by
^1 (qA1; qB2; q^B1; q^A2)  1 (qA1; q^B1; q^A2; qB2)
and
^2 (qA1; qB2; q^B1; q^A2)  2 (q^A2; qB2; qA1; q^B1) :
In the special case where q^A2 = q^B1 = 0, this game simplies to the di¤erentiated monoproduct-
rm Cournot duopoly introduced in Section 3, where each good is sold by only one rm.
We will assume that this game   has the following properties:
( :1) Game   has a unique Nash equilibrium, (~qA1 (q^A2; q^B1) ; ~qB2 (q^B1; q^A2)).
We will denote rm is equilibrium prot by ~i (q^B1; q^A2).
( :2) The aggregate equilibrium prot,
~ (q^B1; q^A2) = ~1 (q^B1; q^A2) + ~2 (q^B1; q^A2)
is uniquely maximized for q^B1 = q^A2 = 0; that is, ~ (0; 0) > ~ (q^B1; q^A2) whenever q^B1 +
q^A2 > 0.
( :3) The equilibrium quantity ~qA1 (q^A2; 0) (resp., ~qB2 (q^B1; 0)) is (weakly) decreasing in q^A2
(resp., q^B1).
These properties are satised in the case of linear demand. In the Online Appendix D, we
provide more general su¢ cient conditions on demand that ensure that ( :1)  ( :3) do indeed
hold.
6.2 Pairwise Vertical Integration
Consider rst the case where two rms, say MA   R1 and MB   R2, are vertically integrated.
Intuitively, each manufacturer then has an incentive to protect its own retailer from intrabrand
competition. The following proposition shows that pairwise vertical integration leads indeed
to complete foreclosure of downstream rivals, mirroring the outcome under pairwise exclusive
dealing:
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Proposition 8 Suppose MA   R1 and MB   R2 are vertically integrated. Then, there exists
a unique equilibrium, in which each integrated manufacturer forecloses the rival retailer. The
equilibrium thus replicates the outcome of pairwise exclusivity.
Proof. See Appendix I.
The proposition shows that pairwise vertical integration leads to a strong form of foreclosure,
as each integrated rm refuses to deal with the other integrated rm. Moreover, combined
with Lemma 2, it shows that pairwise vertical integration is less competitive than single
vertical integration. It follows from our previous welfare analysis that vertical integration harms
consumers and society. In particular, under pairwise vertical integration both prices are higher
(and consumer surplus as well as social welfare are thus lower) than under vertical separation.
6.3 Single Vertical Integration
We now turn to the case where a single upstream-downstream pair, MA   R1 say, is verti-
cally integrated. Our previous analysis allows us to provide a very partial characterization of
equilibrium:
Lemma 2 Suppose that MA and R1 are vertically integrated whereas MB and R2 are not.
Then, in equilibrium, the unintegrated manufacturer MB signs a cost-based contract with each
retailer. The vector of equilibrium quantities, (qA1; q

A2; q

B1; q

B2), is thus such that
qBh = arg maxqBh
[P (qBh + q

Bk; q

Ah + q

Ak)  c] qBh + P (qAh + qAk; qBh + qBk) qAh
for all h 6= k 2 f1; 2g.
Proof. This is an immediate implication of Lemma 1.
Intuitively, the integrated MA does not need access to R2 to sell its good (any unit that MA
sells through R2 could instead be sold directly through the downstream a¢ liate R1), and it has
moreover an incentive to protect its own retailer R1 from intrabrand competition. To capture
this intuition, we will assume that game   has the following property:
( :4) The expressions
~ (q^A2; q

B1) maxqB2 [P (q

B1 + qB2; ~qA1 (q^A2; q

B1))  c] qB2
and
~ (q^A2; q

B1) maxqA1 f[P (qA1; q

B1 + ~qB2 (q

B1; q^A2))  c] qA1 + [P (qB1 + ~qB2 (qB1; q^A2) ; qA1)  c] qB1g
are maximized at q^A2 = 0.
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This property holds, for instance, when demand is linear. The following proposition shows
that there then exists an equilibrium in which the integrated rm will not supply its downstream
rival:
Proposition 9 Suppose that MA and R1 are vertically integrated whereas MB and R2 are not.
Then, there exists an equilibrium in which the integrated MA forecloses the independent R2. This
equilibrium thus yields the same retail prices and quantities as under single exclusivity, but gives
R2 a higher expected prot.
Proof. See Appendix J.
In the equilibrium characterized by the proposition, the vertical merger between MA and
R1 has the same impact on consumers as an exclusive distribution contract between MA and
R1, or a single branding contract between MB and R2. However, in contrast to the case of
exclusive dealing, thanks to the competition between the two manufacturers for its business, the
independent R2 extracts some rents even when manufacturers are the proposers. In equilibrium,
MA makes an attractive o¤er to R2, the anticipation of which prompts MB to make a generous
o¤er to R2, which in turn prevents MA from winning the competition for R2s business.
Remark: On equilibrium uniqueness. When retailers are the proposers, it is shown in Ap-
pendix J that foreclosure of the downstream rival is the unique equilibrium outcome under a
mild regularity condition.
Our analysis of exclusive dealing implies that rms have an incentive to integrate vertically:
If no rm is vertically integrated, there exists a manufacturer-retailer pair, sayMA and R1, that
can increase its joint prot by merging. Moreover, if MA and R1 are vertically integrated, then
MB and R2 can also increase their joint prot by merging.
We conclude this section by noting that complete foreclosure arises here from the fact
that a single retailer su¢ ces to serve the entire market. If it were not the case, e.g., due to
downstream capacity constraints or to di¤erentiation among the retailers, then integrated man-
ufacturers would still wish to deal with downstream rivals in order to expand market coverage
or serve customer niches; in such situations, we would thus expect vertical integration to result
into partial rather then complete foreclosure. By the same token, in such situations vertical
integration (and partial foreclosure) is likely to be more protable than exclusive dealing (and
thus complete foreclosure).29
29See Rey and Tirole (2007) for an analysis of the impact of downstream di¤erentiation on the extent of
foreclosure in the case of an upstream monopoly.
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7 Related Literature
7.1 Common Agency versus Interlocking Relationships
A substantial body of literature has studied common agency situations in which competing
rms deal with the same unique partner. When multiple suppliers deal with a common down-
stream rm, there is a unique equilibrium in terms of downstream prices and quantities, although
the resulting prot can be shared in multiple ways. Furthermore, equilibrium contracts are not
only bilaterally e¢ cient, but they also maximize total industry prot.30 As a result, there is no
incentive to engage in exclusive dealing (that is, single branding) or to integrate vertically. By
contrast, when multiple downstream competitors (secretly) negotiate with a common supplier,
there is a unique equilibrium outcome (also in terms of prot sharing) and contracts are still
bilaterally e¢ cient, but they no longer maximize total industry prot; as a result, rms have an
incentive to opt for exclusivity (that is, to sign an exclusive distribution agreement) or vertical
integration.31
Allowing for interlocking relationships in a successive duopoly setting, we show the exis-
tence of a unique equilibrium outcome in terms of downstream prices and quantities, and that
the resulting prot can be shared in di¤erent ways, depending on the type of contracts that are
signed. We also nd that contracts are not only bilaterally e¢ cient, but also trilaterally e¢ -
cientin that they maximize the joint prot of the retailer with both manufacturers (given the
quantities sold by the other retailer); however, they fail to maximize total industry prot. As a
result, and regardless of rmsrelative bargaining power as well as which equilibrium is selected,
rms have an incentive to adopt exclusivity provisions or to integrate vertically. The analysis
moreover explores further the distinction between exclusive distribution and single branding
provisions. While rms always have an incentive to adopt exclusive distribution agreements,
single branding provisions appear to be less attractive.
7.2 Multilateral Bargaining in Vertically Related Industries
Modelling multiple interlocking relationships is challenging. Two approaches have been adopted
in the literature. The Nash-in-Nash approach combines the cooperative Nash bargaining
solution with the spirit of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium: for each vertical pair, the
30See Bernheim and Whinston (1985, 1986b, 1998) and OBrien and Sha¤er (1997). Note that these insights
obtain regardless of whether contracts are public or private.
31See Hart and Tirole (1990), OBrien and Sha¤er (1992) and McAfee and Schwartz (1994).
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equilibrium contract maximizes the joint prot of the two partners (and divides it according to a
given sharing rule),32 taking as given all other equilibrium contracts.33 This, however, implicitly
assumes that one rm cannot adjust its behavior in one negotiation, when contemplating a move
in another negotiation. The other approach, which we have adopted here, considers instead
the (subgame-perfect) Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game, in which one side makes
take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to the other side.34 However, to allow for arbitrary bargaining power
between upstream and downstream partners, as in Chemla (2003) we assume that either side
(manufacturers or retailers) gets to make the o¤ers with some probability.
The Nash-in-Nash approach typically assumes that each party assigns di¤erent agents to
negotiate with their di¤erent partners, which moreover do not communicate with each other; a
rm thus appears schizophrenic in the sense that, when making or receiving an unexpected
o¤er in the negotiation with one partner, it cannot adjust its behavior in its bargaining with
other partners. Recently, Collard-Wexler et al. (2015) provide a non-cooperative foundation for
Nash-in-Nash bargaining over lump-sum payments, based on simultaneous bilateral negotiations
with alternating moves à la Stahl-Rubinstein. However, their approach applies only to a limited
set of environments with given, positive gains from trade (that is, the focus is on prot sharing,
taking as a given the prot generated by each market structure) and declining returns from
additional agreements. It therefore does not apply in the more general setting considered here,
where the gains from trade depend also on the contracts signed by the negotiating parties (with
each other, and with their other partners), as well as on the contracts signed by the other rms.
7.3 Economic Environments
The IO literature on vertically related markets has mostly focused on upstream (or downstream)
monopolies, on competing vertical structureswhere each upstream rm deals with a distinct
32The bilateral Nash bargaining solution indeed entails joint prot maximization when the partners can share
this prot anyway they want. This is for instance the case when non-linear tari¤s are feasible, as in our setting,
or when wholesale prices are negotiated at the same time as, or after, retail pricing decisions, as often assumed
in the empirical literature on healthcare or cable-TV networks.
33This approach was pioneered by Crémer and Riordan (1987) and Horn and Wolinsky (1988). Recent empirical
and theoretical work includes Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012), Crawford et al. (2015), Ho and Lee (2015), de
Fontenay and Gans (2014) and Collard-Wexler et al. (2015).
34Seminal contributions applying this approach to interlocking vertical relations include Ordover, Saloner and
Salop (1990), Hart and Tirole (1990) and McAfee and Schwartz (1994).
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set of downstream rms (e.g., franchise networks),35 or on homogeneous suppliers.36 The other
papers di¤er from ours in terms of the types of contracts that are considered or their observability.
7.3.1 Secret versus Public Contracting
Much of the existing literature on vertically related markets assumes that wholesale tari¤s are
publicly observed by all rms, which gives rise to pre-commitment e¤ects, with rms departing
from bilateral e¢ ciency for purely strategic reasons.37 However, this assumption is not very
plausible in many industries, where the terms of supply contracts are kept highly condential.
Furthermore, as noted by Hart and Tirole (1990), while rms may make their contracts public
so as to inuence their rivalsbehavior, they have an incentive to renegotiate the terms privately
so as to achieve bilateral e¢ ciency.
Throughout the paper, we thus focus on secret contracting, and assume that the terms of an
agreement as well as acceptance decisions are private information to the two contracting parties,
and not observed by rival rms.38
7.3.2 On the Class of Contracts
The papers studying interlocking vertical relationships often restrict attention to particular types
of (public) contracts such as linear tari¤s or two-part tari¤s. For instance, Lee and Fong (2013)
and Collard-Wexler et al. (2015) focus on the division of gains from trade and restrict attention
to lump-sum payments, treating the reduced-form prots from a given network structure as
primitives. Other papers are relying on linear tari¤s,39 which are bilaterally ine¢ cient as they
create double-marginalization problems. As a result, vertical integration involves e¢ ciency gains
35Papers featuring competing vertical structures include Bonanno and Vickers (1988), Rey and Stiglitz (1988,
1995), Gal-Or (1991), Jullien and Rey (2007), and Piccolo and Miklós-Thal (2012).
36See, e.g., Nocke and White (2007, 2010).
37See footnote 1 for references.
38Seminal papers on secret contracting in vertically related markets include Hart and Tirole (1990), OBrien
and Sha¤er (1992) and McAfee and Schwartz (1994).
39See, e.g., Dobson and Waterson (2007) and Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012). In much of the recent empirical
literature on the U.S. health care industry, including Gowrisankaran, Nevo, and Town (2015), Ho and Lee (2015),
and Crawford et al. (2015), the contracts between upstream and downstream rms (hospitals and insurers, re-
spectively) are assumed to be linear. In these papers, hospital prices are assumed to be determined either after,
or simultaneously with, downstream prices, implying that the negotiation of the hospital prices focuses on the
division of xed gains from trade.
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(by eliminating double marginalization problems) as well as strategic motives. De Fontenay
and Gans (2005, 2014) focus instead on quantity forcing contracts. Finally, a few papers have
considered two-part tari¤s,40 which are bilaterally e¢ cient, but impose a given division of prots;
we show that other contracts can be used to sustain di¤erent divisions of the industry prot.
We allow here for general contracts, thereby enabling rms to achieve bilateral e¢ ciency. So
doing also allows for a sharper welfare analysis that focuses on the strategic e¤ects of exclusive
dealing and vertical integration.
Finally, following most of the vertical contracting literature, we restrict attention to purely
bilateral agreements that cannot condition on trade taking place with other partners.41 In
contrast, de Fontenay and Gans (2014) consider contracts that are explicitly contingent on
the set of active channels. They establish the existence of an equilibrium in which prot is
distributed according to the Myerson-Shapley value, which thus gives each supplier a sizeable
share of the prot, even in the case of perfectly substitutable suppliers. By contrast, in our
setting, manufacturers never obtain more than their contribution to the industry prot; their
prots thus go to zero as they become closer substitutes, regardless of their bargaining power in
the bilateral negotiations.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a tractable framework for the analysis of interlocking bilateral rela-
tionships in vertically related markets. Key features of the framework include the absence of
any restriction on the contracts that can be signed (e.g., lump-sum payments, linear or two-part
tari¤s, forcing contracts, and so forth), secret contracting (i.e., contract terms are private in-
formation to the contracting parties), balanced bargaining power in each bilateral negotiation,
product di¤erentiation in the upstream market and quantity competition in the downstream
market.
We rst characterize the equilibrium outcomes in the absence of any exclusive dealing pro-
vision and vertical integration. We show that all channels are then active, and that they trade
at bilaterally e¢ cient levels; as a result, the equilibrium downstream prices and quantities are
unique, and they replicate the outcome of a multiproduct-rm Cournot oligopoly. This equilib-
40See, e.g., Rey and Vergé (2010) and Allain and Chambolle (2011).
41Firms can, however, use menus of options (implicitly) designed for di¤erent network structures, and indeed
must do so in equilibrium (see the discussion of bumping problems in Section 4).
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rium outcome cannot be sustained by simple forcing contracts, but can be sustained by two-part
tari¤s, for instance, or by menus of forcing contracts (with an option designed for exclusivity,
and another one designed for non-exclusivity). How the resulting prot is shared among rms
depends not only on their bargaining power, however, but also on the type of tari¤s that are
used. When two-part tari¤s or similar contracts are used, manufacturers obtain the full share of
their contribution to the prots generated by retailers. By contrast, with other tari¤s retailers
can obtain a larger share of the prots that they generate and can even appropriate all prots,
regardless of their market power. These tari¤s must however o¤er below-cost prices for units
beyond the equilibrium levels.
We use this framework to shed some light on a long-standing debate on vertical foreclosure.
More specically, we analyze the positive and normative e¤ects of exclusive dealing and vertical
integration, and show that, from a purely strategic standpoint, rms have an incentive to engage
in exclusive dealing or vertical integration to exert more market power, at the expense of con-
sumers and society. Surprisingly, this is the case regardless of rmsrelative bargaining power,
as well as of which equilibrium arises (and thus, of the division of prots between upstream and
downstream rms) before and after the adoption of an exclusive dealing agreement or a vertical
merger.
For simplicity, we focus here on the strategic e¤ects of vertical integration and exclusive
dealing, and show that they give rise to antitrust concerns. However, as is well-known, these
vertical agreements can also generate e¢ ciencies. Vertical integration can, for instance, eliminate
double marginalization problems, and more generally these arrangements can be used to align
the interests and incentives of the trading partners. Yet, our analysis suggests that there may
be a trade-o¤ from an antitrust policy standpoint.
For the sake of exposition, we make a number of simplifying assumptions. The arguments
and the underlying intuition however make clear that many of these could easily be relaxed at
the cost of heavier notation and a more cumbersome exposition. In particular, the framework
could be extended to any number of rms, with arbitrary costs, in the upstream and downstream
markets, to asymmetric upstream di¤erentiation, or to di¤erent bargaining power across rms
or across channels. A more substantial extension would account for product di¤erentiation in
the downstream market. As discussed in Sections 5.2 and 6.3, in this case, exclusive dealing
provisions are likely to be less attractive, and vertical integration may no longer lead to complete
foreclosure of rival retailers.
A more challenging avenue for future research involves analyzing downstream price compe-
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tition, which is known to raise complex issues for the treatment of out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
Another exciting avenue for future research consists in studying the positive and normative
e¤ects of other contractual arrangements, such as delity rebates based on market shares,
Most-Favored-Nation clauses, or agency contracts.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
Consider rst the case where the manufacturers are the proposers, and x a candidate equilib-
rium, with associated equilibrium quantities (qeih)i=A;B;h=1;2 and acceptance decisions (
e
ih)i=A;B;h=1;2,
with the convention that eih = 1 if Mi and Rh are vertically integrated and, when they are in-
dependent, eih = 1 if the o¤er is accepted and 
e
ih = 0 if it is not (in which case q
e
ih = 0).
Suppose further that, in this equilibrium, the unintegrated Mi signs with Rh a contract that
is not cost-based, i.e., qeih =2 

qeik; q
e
jh; q
e
jh

. Consider now a deviation by Mi to a cost-based
two-part tari¤ (c; ~Fih), where the xed fee ~Fih is as follows:
 if Rh is vertically integrated with Mj , then:
~Fih = max
qih

P
 
qih + q
e
ik; q
e
jh + q
e
jk
  c qih
+

P
 
qejh + q
e
jk; qih + q
e
ik
  c qejh + ejk  ejk  qejk  cqejk	  ej h; (5)
where ej h denotes the prot of the integrated rmMj Rh in the candidate equilibrium.
The terms in curly brackets represent the prot (gross of the xed fee ~Fih) that the
vertically integrated rm Mj   Rh would make if Rh accepted Mis deviant o¤er and
maintained the equilibrium quantity qejh, and Rk maintained the equilibrium quantities q
e
ik
and qejk:
 the rst two terms are the prots generated by, respectively, the channels Mi   Rh
and Mj  Rh,
whereas the third term is the prot that Mj generates in equilibrium through the
sales to the other, unintegrated retailer Rk.
 if instead Rh is not vertically integrated, then:
~Fih = max
qih

P
 
qih + q
e
ik; 
e
jhq
e
jh + q
e
jk
  c qih
+ejh

P
 
qejh + q
e
jk; qih + q
e
ik

qejh    ejh
 
qejh
	  eh; (6)
where eh denotes the prot that the unintegrated Rh makes in equilibrium. The terms
in curly brackets represent the prot (gross of the xed fee ~Fih) that the unintegrated Rh
would make if it accepted Mis deviant o¤er and maintained its acceptance decision ejh
32
vis-à-vis Mjs contract o¤er as well as the equilibrium quantity qejh, and Rk maintained
the equilibrium quantities qeik and q
e
jk:
 the rst term is the prot generated by the channel Mi  Rh,
whereas the second term is the prot that Rh makes on its contract with Mj .
We rst claim that Rh is willing to accept the deviant o¤er (c; ~Fih):
1. As wary beliefs boil down to passive beliefs in this situation, at the acceptance stage Rh
continues to believe that its downstream rival Rk has been o¤ered the equilibrium contracts
and will sell the equilibrium quantities qeik and q
e
jk in the continuation game.
2. By accepting Mis deviant o¤er, Rh can make the same prot as in the candidate equilib-
rium by sticking to its acceptance decision vis-à-visMjs equilibrium o¤er and maintaining
the quantity qjh at its equilibrium level qejh, and can do only better by optimizing over
these decisions.
3. If instead Rh rejects Mis deviant o¤er, it obtains the same prot as in the continuation
game following the rejection ofMis equilibrium o¤er. By construction, this cannot exceed
Mis equilibrium prot: it constitutes the equilibrium prot if in equilibrium Rh rejects
 eih, and must be (weakly) lower otherwise.
As Rh is willing to accept this deviant o¤er (and can be induced to do so, if needed, by slightly
reducing the xed fee ~Fih), which gives Mi a prot equal to ~Fih, this deviation is unprotable
only if ~Fih  ei;h, where
ei;h = 
e
ih [
e
ih (q
e
ih)  cqeih]
denotes the equilibrium prot that Mi makes from selling through retailer Rh. But then:
 If Rh is vertically integrated with Mj (implying eih = 1), we can rewrite ei;h as follows:
ei;h =

P
 
qeih + q
e
ik; q
e
jh + q
e
jk
  c qeih
+

P
 
qejh + q
e
jk; q
e
ih + q
e
ik
  c qejh + ejk  ejk  qejk  cqejk	  ej h:
Using (5), ei;h  ~Fih then implies qeih 2 

qeik; q
e
jh; q
e
jh

.
 If instead Rh is unintegrated, we can rewrite ei;h as follows:
i;h =

P
 
qeih + q
e
ik; 
e
jhq
e
jh + q
e
jk
  c qeih
+ejh

P
 
qejh + q
e
jk; q
e
ih + q
e
ik

qejh    ejh
 
qejh
	  eh:
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Using (6), ei;h  ~Fih then implies qeih 2 

qeik; q
e
jh; q
e
jh

.
Let us now turn to the case where the retailers are the proposers, and consider the negotiation
between Rh and an unintegrated Mi. Because returns to scale are constant, the contract that
it signs with the rival retailer Rk does not a¤ect the prot that Mi derives from the contract
signed with Rh. Therefore, in the negotiation with Rh, Mi is willing to supply any quantity qih
in return for any payment that covers the cost cqih.
Furthermore, as discussed in footnote 2, if Mi is indi¤erent between supplying di¤erent
quantities to Rk, we assume that Mis choice about qik does not depend on the terms o¤ered
by Rh. It follows that, in equilibrium, Rh will ask Mi to supply a bilateral e¢ cient quantity
qih 2 

qik; q

jh; q

jk

, in return for a payment that just covers the cost.
B Proof of Proposition 1
Part (i) of Proposition 1 derives from Lemma 1: As every channelMi Rh must sign a cost-based
contract, the quantities must be the same as if retailers were producing themselves the goods at
unit cost c. From (P:1), in this symmetric duopoly with multiproduct rms, the equilibrium is
unique, and thus symmetric: Both retailers sell the same quantity q > 0 of both goods.
We now turn to part (ii) of Proposition 1. Consider rst the case when the retailers are
the proposers. From Lemma 1, all equilibria give zero prot to manufacturers. Conversely, this
equilibrium outcome can be supported by both retailers o¤ering to buy any quantity at cost,
i.e., o¤ering each manufacturer the two-part tari¤ (c; 0). As a manufacturer is then indi¤erent
between any quantity, selling q to each retailer is a continuation equilibrium. It remains to check
that no retailer has an incentive to deviate and o¤er a di¤erent contract. As manufacturers would
not accept to supply a quantity below cost, by deviating to given quantities qA and qB, a retailer
cannot obtain more than the prot R (qA; qB). From (P:1), no such deviation is protable.
Alternatively, the same equilibrium outcome can be supported by both retailers o¤ering each
manufacturer the forcing contract (q; cq): Manufacturers are willing to accept this contract,
and the argument just mentioned ensures that retailers have no incentives to deviation.
We now turn to the case when manufacturers are the proposers, and rst establish the
existence of an equilibrium that relies on two-part tari¤s, in which each manufacturer signs the
cost-based tari¤ (w; F ) = (c;) with each retailer.
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We rst note that it is a continuation equilibrium for each retailer to accept both manufac-
turerso¤ers and then sell (q; q):
 If Rh accepts both manufacturers o¤ers and expects its rival Rk to sell (qAk; qBk) =
(q; q), for h 6= k 2 f1; 2g, then Rhs prot, gross of the xed fees, is equal to
R (qA; qB)  [P (qA + q; qB + q)  c] qA + [P (qB + q; qA + q)  c] qB:
This prot coincides with that of a rm in the multiproduct-rm Cournot duopoly; hence,
from (P:1), it is a best response for Rh to sell (qAh; qBh) = (q; q). Therefore, if both re-
tailers accept both manufacturerso¤ers, it is a continuation equilibrium for both retailers
to sell (q; q).
 To see that each retailer is willing to carry both goods, it su¢ ces to note that the fee is
such that:
F  =  =

2
 max
q
f[P (q + q; q)  c] qg
= R (q
; q) max
q
R (q; 0) :
Therefore, if its rival were to accept both o¤ers and sell (q; q), then a retailer:
Obtains the same prot, R, by accepting both manufacturerso¤ers or only one of
them: Accepting both o¤er yields a prot equal to
R = 

R (q
; q)  2F  = max
q
R (q; 0)  F ;
where the right-hand side corresponds precisely to the maximal prot that the retailer
could achieve by accepting only one manufacturers o¤er.
 Strictly prefers securing this prot to rejecting both o¤ers:
R
2
= [P (2q; 2q)  c] q   F 
= max
q
[P (q + q; q)  c] q   [P (2q; 2q)  c] q
> max
q
[P (q + q; q)  c] q   [P (2q; q)  c] q
 0:
We now show that manufacturers cannot protably deviate from this candidate equilibrium.
As the prot that a manufacturer achieves with a retailer is not a¤ected by its relation with the
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other retailer, without loss of generality we can restrict attention to one-sideddeviations, in
which a manufacturer o¤ers a deviating contract to one of the retailers. Furthermore, the above
tari¤s are protable for the manufacturers:
F  = R (q
; q) max
q
R (q; 0)
= max
qA;qB
R (qA; qB) maxq 

R (q; 0)
> 0;
where the second equality comes from the denition of q and the inequality comes from the fact
that the second optimization problem is more constrained than the rst one (and the optimal
qA and qB are indeed both positive, as from (P:1) they are equal to q > 0). It follows that
a deviation cannot be protable if it is not accepted by the retailer; and since the retailer can
secure its equilibrium prot R by accepting only the rivals o¤er, it must be the case that the
deviation increases the joint prot of the manufacturer and of the retailer.
If the deviation induces the retailer to keep dealing with the other manufacturer, then the
joint prot of the manufacturer and of the retailer (gross of the manufacturers cost of supplying
q to the rival retailer, which is not a¤ected by the deviation) cannot exceed
max
qA;qB
R (qA; qB) = 

R (q
; q) ;
which the two parties already obtain in the candidate equilibrium. Therefore, such a deviation
cannot be protable.
If instead the deviation induces the retailer to reject the other manufacturers o¤er, then the
joint prot of the manufacturer and of the retailer (again gross of the manufacturers cost of
supplying q to the rival retailer) cannot exceed
max
q
f[P (q + q; q)  c] qg+ F  = max
q
f[P (q + q; q)  c] qg+

R (q
; q) max
q
R (q; 0)

= R (q
; q) ;
which is again what they obtain in the candidate equilibrium. Therefore, such a deviation cannot
be protable either, which concludes the argument.
Finally, we characterize the set of equilibrium prots for the case when manufacturers are
the proposers. As wary beliefs then boil down to passive beliefs, we can focus on one particular
retailer R, taking as given that the other retailer will sell (q; q). Let
R (qA; qB)  P (qA + q; qB + q) qA + P (qB + q; qA + q) qB
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denote the total revenue generated by R selling (qA; qB). From (P:1), the associated prot
R (qA; qB)  R (qA; qB)  c (qA + qB)
reaches its maximum at (qA; qB) = (q; q), where it is equal to half the aggregate industry
prot, R (q
; q) = =2.
Let iR (qi) denote the equilibrium tari¤ that Mi o¤ers R, 

i;R  iR (q)  cq denote Mis
equilibrium prot from supplying R, and R  =2 A;R B;R denote Rs equilibrium prot.
Also, let
~qiR 2 arg maxqi 

R (qi; 0)  iR (qi) (7)
denote the output level that R would choose under exclusivity with Mi, and ~i;R  iR (~qiR) 
c~qiR denote Mis associated prot (the corresponding prot for R is thus 

R (~q

iR; 0)  ~i;R). Let
^R  maxq 

R (q; 0)
denote the maximal prot that can be generated under exclusivity, and
  

2
  ^R
denote the contribution of a manufacturer to the equilibrium prot. We have:
Lemma 3 Output and prot levels satisfy ~qiR > q
 and
0  i;R   (8)
for i = A;B, and
R =

2
  A;R   B;R = R (~qAR; 0)  ~A;R = R (~qBR; 0)  ~B;R > 0: (9)
Proof. We rst provide bounds on equilibrium payo¤s, before turning to the comparison
between ~qiR and q
.
By construction, we have i;R  0 for i = A;B. Furthermore, if i;R >  = =2  ^R for
some i 2 fA;Bg, then the aggregate prot of R and the other manufacturer Mj (gross of the
prot that Mj makes with the other retailer), is such that:
R + 

j;R =

2
  i;R = ^R +    i;R < ^R:
But then, Mj could protably deviate to exclusivity by o¤ering a forcing contract of the form
q^; T^

, where q^  arg maxq R (q; 0) denotes the bilaterally e¢ cient output under exclusivity:
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By accepting this o¤er (and only that one), R would generate a bilateral prot of ^R, and T^
can be adjusted so as to ensure that both Mj and R benet from the deviation. It follows that
A;R; 

B;R  , which in turn implies that the retailer obtains a positive prot:
R =

2
  A;R   B;R 

2
  2


2
  ^R

= 2^R  

2
> 0;
where the inequality stems from the fact that, from Assumption (A:1), goods A and B are (im-
perfect) substitutes. Finally, (9) follows from the fact that, in equilibrium, R must be indi¤erent
between accepting both manufacturerso¤ers, or only one (either one). By construction, R must
weakly prefer accepting both o¤ers to either one exclusively; but if R were strictly preferring
accepting both o¤ers to accepting one manufacturers o¤er only, then the other manufacturer
could ask for a bigger share of the pie.
We now establish ~qiR > q
. By a revealed preference argument, we have:
R (~q

iR; 0)  iR (~qiR)  R (q; 0)  iR (q) ;
R (q
; q)  iR (q)  R (~qiR; q)  iR (~qiR) ;
where the rst inequality follows from (7) and the second one follows from the denition of q.
Therefore:
R (~q

iR; 0)  R (q; 0)  R (~qiR; q)  R (q; q)
()
Z ~qiR
q
@1

R (x; 0) dx 
Z ~qiR
q
@1

R (x; q
) dx
()
Z ~qiR
q
Z q
0
@212

R (x; y) dxdy  0:
As q > 0 and @212R = @
2
12

R < 0 from (P:1), it follows that ~q

iR  q.
Assume now that ~qiR = q
, which implies iR (q
) = iR (~q

iR) and thus 

i;R = ~

i;R; hence,
from condition (9), both Mi and R are indi¤erent between R accepting both manufacturers
equilibrium o¤ers, or only Mis o¤er. But then, Mi could protably deviate to exclusivity by
o¤ering a forcing contract of the form

q^; T^

: By accepting this o¤er (and only that one),
R would increase their bilateral prot from R (q
; 0) to ^R = maxq 

R (q; 0) > 

R (q
; 0),
where the strict inequality stems from that fact that, from (P:1) the goods are internal strategic
substitutes, and thus q^ = arg maxq R (q; 0) > q
; this increase in the bilateral prot can then
be shared by an appropriate T^ so as to ensure that both Mi and R benet from the deviation.
Therefore, ~qiR > q
.
This Lemma has an interesting implication:
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Corollary 1 There is no equilibrium in which a manufacturer o¤ers a single forcing contract.
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 3, which implies that equilibrium contracts must
o¤er at least two relevant options, q and ~qiR 6= q.
We now show that, without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to pairs of forcing
contracts:
Lemma 4 Let fAR (:) ; BR (:)g denote the tari¤s signed by retailer R in a given equilibrium,
with associated equilibrium prots A;R, 

B;R and 

R = 
=2   A;R   B;R, and let ~iR 
f(q; iR (q)) ; (~qiR; iR (~qiR))g denote the corresponding pair of forcing contracts, respectively
based on the equilibrium output level q and on the output level ~qiR that R would choose under
exclusivity with Mi. Then there exists an equilibrium in which each Mi o¤ers the tari¤ ~iR,
leading R to pick the forcing contract (q; iR (q
)); this alternative equilibrium moreover yields
the same prots A;R, 

B;R and 

R.
Proof. Fix a given equilibrium based on tari¤s fAR (:) ; BR (:)g, and consider an alterna-
tive candidate equilibrium in which each manufacturer o¤ers instead ~iR = f(q; iR (q)) ; (~qiR; iR (~qiR))g.
From Lemma 3 , R is willing to accept both o¤ers, in which case it chooses the option
(q; iR (q
)) from each ~iR, and is indi¤erent between doing so and accepting only Mis o¤er
(for i = A;B), in which case it chooses the option (~qiR; 

iR (~q

iR)). We now show that manufac-
turers have no incentive to deviate.
Without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to deviations involving a single forcing
contract. As i;R  0 from Lemma 3, to be protable the deviant o¤er must be accepted, either
alone or in combination with one of the two options o¤ered by Mj ; but as these options are
also available in jR (:), the deviant o¤er would also be accepted in the original equilibrium, and
thus cannot be protable.
From now on, without loss of generality we will consider equilibria in which each Mi o¤ers
two options: that is, iR =
n
(q; T iR) ;

~qiR; ~T

iR
o
.
Lemma 5 The contracts

i =
n
(q; T iR) ;

~qiR; ~T

iR
o
i=A;B
support an equilibrium if and
only if the associated prots

i;R = T

iR   cq; ~i;R = ~T iR   c~qiR

i=A;B
and R = 
=2 A;R 
B;R satisfy (8), (9) and
i;R   ~i;R 

2
 rR (~qiR) ; (10)
where
rR (qi)  maxq 

R (q; qi)
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denotes the maximal aggregate prot that R can generate, conditional on selling qi units of good
i.
Proof. We rst establish that the contracts fA; Bg support an equilibrium under condi-
tions (8), (9) and (10).
We start by checking that R is willing to accept both contracts, and to pick the options
f(q; T AR) ; (q; T BR)g:
 From (9), R is willing to accept the o¤ers, and is indi¤erent between accepting f(q; T AR) ; (q; T BR)g,n
~qAR; ~T

AR
o
, or
n
~qBR; ~T

BR
o
;
 In addition, R prefers accepting f(q; T AR) ; (q; T BR)g, which yield R, to accepting only
(q; T iR): This amounts to

2
  A;R   B;R > R (q; 0)  i;R;
or:
j;R <

2
 R (q; 0) ; (11)
which follows from (8), as the RHS of (11) is strictly larger than .
 From (7), if R were to accept Mis contract only, then it would pick the option

~qiR; ~T

iR

rather than (q; T iR).
 Finally, R prefers accepting f(q; T AR) ; (q; T BR)g to accepting
n
~qi ; ~T

iR

;

q; T jR
o
,
which amounts to:

2
  A;R   A;R  R (q; ~qiR)  j;R   ~i;R
() i;R   ~i;R 

2
 R (q; ~qiR) ;
and is thus implied by (10).
We now turn to deviations by the manufacturers:
 Mi has no incentive to deviate by making an unacceptable o¤er (or no o¤er), as i;R  0.
 Mi has no incentive to deviate to exclusivity. To see that, it su¢ ces to note that, as R
can secure its equilibrium prot by accepting Mjs o¤er only, to be protable a deviation must
increase the joint prot of Mi and R; but along the equilibrium path, this joint prot (gross of
the prot that Mi makes with the other retailer) satises:
R + 

i;R =

2
  j;R 

2
  = ^R;
where ^R is the maximal prot that can be achieved under exclusivity.
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 Mi cannot protably deviate by inducing R to combine the deviant o¤er with Mjs equi-
librium option

q; T jR

. As the prot generated by R is maximal along the equilibrium path
(that is, =2 = maxqA;qB 

R (qA; qB)), a deviation byMi that induces R to combine the deviant
o¤er with Mjs equilibrium option

q; T jR

cannot be protable, as this would maintain Mjs
prot at the equilibrium level (that is, Mj would obtain a T jR   cq = j;R), and a deviation
cannot lower Rs prot either.
 Finally, Mi cannot protably deviate by inducing R to combine the deviant o¤er with Mjs
alternative option

~qj ; ~T

jR

. As R can secure its equilibrium prot by acceptingMjs o¤er only,
such a deviation could only be protable if it increased the joint prot of Mi and R, gross of
the prot that Mi makes with the other retailer, that is, only if :
R
 
qi; ~q

j
  ~j;R > 2   j;R;
which is ruled out by (10) (written for Mj).
Conversely, conditions (8) and (9) are necessary by Lemma 3. Moreover, the above analysis
shows that, if (10) were violated, then Mj could protably deviate by inducing R to combine
Mis alternative option

~qi ; ~T

iR

with a forcing contract based on qrR (~q

i ) = arg maxq 

R (q; ~q

i )
and a payment giving R slightly more than its equilibrium prot.
We now show that Mjs equilibrium prot can cover the full range [0;] by relying on a
large enoughquantity ~qiR for Mis exclusive deal option.
Lemma 6 For any A;R; 

B;R 2 [0;], there exists an equilibrium yielding prots A;R, B;R
and R = 
=2  A;R   B;R.
Proof. We rst note that the expression rR (~q)   R (0; ~q) = maxq R (q; ~q)   R (0; ~q)
decreases as ~q increases. Using the envelope theorem, and letting qrR (~q) = arg maxq 

R (q; ~q)
denote Rs best responseto selling a quantity ~q of the other brand, we have:
d
d~q
[rR (~q) R (0; ~q)] = @2R (qrR (~q) ; ~q)  @2R (0; ~q)
=
Z qrR(~q)
0
@12

R (q; ~q) dq;
which is negative as long as qrR (~q) > 0, as @12

R < 0 by (P:1). From (A:2), q
r
R (~q) = 0 for ~q
large enough; let q denote such a quantity and, for any A;R; 

A;R 2 [0;], consider the pairs of
forcing contracts
n
(q; T AR) ;

q; ~T R
o
and
n
(q; T BR) ;

q; ~T R
o
, where the payments are such
that T iR = cq
 + i;R, for i = A;B, and:
~T R = cq + 

R (0; q) + 

A;R + 

B;R  

2
:
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By construction, the prots associated with these contracts satisfy conditions (8) and (9). Fur-
thermore, the remaining equilibrium condition (10) is also satised:
j;R  rR (q) R (0; q) = 0
=) 

2
 rR (q) 

2
 R (0; q)  j;R
= i;R +

2
   R (0; q) + A;R + B;R
= i;R   ~i;R:
Therefore, from Lemma 5, these pairs of forcing contracts support an equilibrium, with prots
A;R; 

B;R

for the manufacturers and R = 
=2  A;R   B;R for R.
Finally, we have:
Lemma 7 If i;R < 
, then Mj strictly prefers R to accept both equilibrium o¤ers than only
its own equilibrium o¤er (i.e., ~j;R < 

j;R).
Proof. Note rst that, as Mj could induce R to switch to exclusivity by slightly reducing
~T iR, we must therefore have 

i;R  ~i;R. Furthermore, if i;R < , then condition (9) yields:
j;R   ~j;R =

2
  i;R  R
 
~qjR; 0

> max
~q
R (~q; 0) R
 
~qjR; 0

 0:
As manufacturers obtain zero prot when retailers are the proposers, it follows from Lemma 3
that the set of expected prots for the two manufacturers is [0; 2][0; 2]. Furthermore, if
Mis expected prot is less than 2, then from Lemma 3 it must be the case that i;R < 
 for
some retailer R; but then, it follows from Lemma 7 thatMj must o¤er to supply the incremental
quantity ~qjR   q below cost.
C Proof of Proposition 2
Part (i) of Proposition 2 derives from Lemma 1: As R1 must sign a cost-based contract with
MA, and R2 must sign a cost-based contract with both manufacturers, the quantities must be
the same as if R1 could produce itself good A at unit cost c, and R2 could produce both goods
at the same cost c. From (P:1), the equilibrium of this asymmetric duopoly is unique.
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It follows that prices and quantities, and thus the prots generated by the two retailers, are
the same in all equilibria:
1 = (p

A   c) qA1 + (pB   c) qB1 and 2 = (pB   c) qB2;
where pi = P

Qi ; Q

j

is the equilibrium price of good i = A;B.
We now turn to part (ii) of Proposition 2. When the retailers are the proposers, the same
logic as before applies. From Lemma 1, all equilibria again give zero prot to manufacturers,
and conversely, this equilibrium outcome can be supported by both retailers o¤ering to buy
any quantity at cost, i.e., R1 o¤ers each manufacturer the two-part tari¤ (c; 0), and R2 o¤ers
MB the same tari¤. As manufacturers are then indi¤erent about quantity choices, the quantity
prole (qA1; q

B1; q

B2) is a continuation equilibrium. It remains to check that no retailer has an
incentive to deviate and o¤er a di¤erent contract. As manufacturers would not accept to supply
a quantity below cost, by deviating to some quantities qA and qB, R1 cannot obtain more than:
1 (qA; qB; 0; q

B2) = [P (qA1; qB1 + q

B2)  c] qA1 + [P (qB1 + qB2; qA1)  c] qB1 ;
and likewise by deviating to some quantity qB2 andR2 cannot obtain more than:
2 (0; qB2; q

A1; q

B1) = [P (q

B1 + qB2; q

A1)  c] qB1:
But these are the prots that the two rms could respectively obtain by deviating from the
equilibrium (qA1; q

B1; q

B2) in the asymmetric Cournot duopoly where one rm produces both
goods (at cost c), and the other rm only produces good B (at the same cost). From (P:1), no
such deviation is protable.
Consider now the case when the manufacturers are the proposers. We rst establish the exis-
tence of an equilibrium in which they o¤er cost-based two-part tari¤s of the form

wi;h; F

i;h

=
c;i;h

, where i;h denotes Mis contribution to the prot generated by Rh, namely (as MB
is the sole supplier of R2, its contributionamounts to R2s prot is 2):
A;1 = 

1  maxqB1 f[P (qB1 + q

B2; 0)  c] qB1g ;
B;1 = 

1  maxqA1 f[P (qA1; q

B2)  c] qA1g ;
B;2 = 

2 = (p

B   c) qB2:
From (P:1), it is then a continuation equilibrium for R1 to sell (qA1; qB1) = (qA1; q

B1) and
for R2 to sell qB2 = qB2. Next, we note that each retailer is willing to accept all o¤ers made.
Indeed, the fees are such that:
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 If R1 expects R2 to sell qB2, then R1 is indi¤erent between accepting both manufacturers
o¤ers or only one (either one);
 If R2 expects R1 to sell (qA1; qB1), then R2 is indi¤erent between accepting MBs o¤er or
not.
It thus su¢ ces to check that R1 is strictly better-o¤ accepting the manufacturers o¤ers
rather than rejecting both of them; indeed, we have:
1 = (p

A   c) qA1 + (pB   c) qB1  A;1  B;1
= max
qA1
f[P (qA1; qB2)  c] qA1g+ maxqB1 f[P (qB1 + q

B2; 0)  c] qB1g
  [(pA   c) qA1 + (pB   c) qB1]
= max
qA1
f[P (qA1; qB2)  c] qA1g   [P (qA1; qB1 + qB2)  c] qA1
+ max
qB1
f[P (qB1 + qB2; 0)  c] qB1g   [P (qB1 + qB2; qA1)  c] qB1
> max
qA1
f[P (qA1; qB2)  c] qA1g   [P (qA1; qB2)  c] qA1
+ max
qB1
f[P (qB1 + qB2; 0)  c] qB1g   [P (qB1 + qB2; 0)  c] qB1
 0:
Thus, if these contracts are o¤ered, it is a continuation equilibrium for retailers to accept all
o¤ers, and then to sell the quantities (qA1; q

B1; q

B2). We now show that manufacturers cannot
protably deviate from this candidate equilibrium.
We rst note that the above tari¤s are protable for the manufacturers, as each manufacturer
contributes positively to the prots generated by the retailers.42 It follows that a deviation
cannot be protable if it is not accepted by the retailer. But then, MB cannot protably deviate
in its o¤er to R2, as it already appropriates all the prot that R2 can expect to generate. Likewise,
no Mi can protably deviate in its dealing with R1, as: (i) Mi and R1 cannot increase their
joint prot above the equilibrium level, as Mj does not obtain more than its contribution to the
prot generated by R1; and (ii) following a deviation by Mi, R1 can still secure its equilibrium
prot by accepting only Mjs o¤er.
42For instance, A;1 can be expressed as
A;1 = f[P (qA1; qB1 + qB2)  c] qA1 + [P (qB1 + qB2; 0)  c] qB1g  max
qB1
f[P (qB1 + qB2; 0)  c] qB1g
= max
qA1;qB1
f[P (qA1; qB1 + qB2)  c] qA1 + [P (qB1 + qB2; 0)  c] qB1g  max
qB1
f[P (qB1 + qB2; 0)  c] qB1g ;
which is positive as qA1 > 0.
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This establishes the existence of an equilibrium that relies on cost-based two-part tari¤s,
and gives MA and MB equilibrium expected prots equal to A;1 and 

B;1 + 

B;2

=


2 + B;1

. Finally, going through the same steps of in the proof of Proposition 1, it can be
shown that any expected payo¤s in the set
h
0; A;1
i

h
2; 

2 + B;1
i
can be supported
in equilibrium. In particular, when manufacturers are the proposers: (i) attention can be re-
stricted to manufacturers o¤ering a pair of forcing contracts to R1, and a single forcing contract
to R2; (ii) R1 must be indi¤erent between accepting both manufacturerso¤ers and accepting
only one of them (either one), and R2 must be indi¤erent between accepting MBs o¤er or not.
D Proof of Proposition 3
Part (i) of Proposition 3 follows again from Lemma 1. In addition, as each rm is locked into
an exclusive relationship with a single partner, the proposers always appropriate all the prot
generated by their channel. That is, when the manufacturers are the proposers, each Mi fully
appropriates the prot generated by good i; when instead the retailers are the proposers, R1
and R2 fully appropriate the prots generated by, respectively, goods A and B.
We now turn to part (ii) of Proposition 3. Suppose rst that the manufacturers are the
proposers, and consider a candidate equilibrium in which they both o¤er the cost-based two-
part tari¤ (w; F ) = (c;R ), where
R = [P (Q
; Q)  c]Q = 

2
denotes the prot generated by a retailer. The retailers are willing to accept those contracts, in
which case they each put Q on the market and break even. Furthermore, each manufacturer
obtains all the prots generated by its good, which is moreover maximal given the output level
Q of the other good; it follows that there is no protable deviation.
When instead the retailers are the proposers, a similar argument implies that there exists
an equilibrium in which retailers o¤er the cost-based two-part tari¤ (c; 0), and then each man-
ufacturer chooses to sell Q.
E Proof of Proposition 4
We start with part (i) of Proposition 4. Let , , and  denote the equilibrium indus-
try prot under no exclusive dealing, single exclusive dealing, and pairwise exclusive dealing,
respectively. From (P:2), we have:  <  < .
45
In the absence of exclusive dealing, at least one pair, say MA   R1, makes a weakly lower
joint prot than the other pair, i.e., MA R1  =2  MB R2 . We show below that this pair,
MA R1, would benet from MA dealing exclusively with R1, although less so if MB also deals
exclusively with R2; i.e.:
MA R1 < 

MA R1 < 

MA R1 ; (12)
where MA R1 , 

MA R1 and 

MA R1 denote the equilibrium joint prot of the pair MA   R1
under, respectively: (i) no exclusivity; (ii) single exclusive dealing where MA only supplies R1
but not R2, whereas MB supplies both retailers; and (iii) pairwise exclusive dealing where MA
supplies R1 only, and MB supplies R2 only.
The rst inequality in (12) follows from (P:2), which yields
MA R1 =

2
>

2
 MA R1 :
To establish the second inequality in (12) we rst note that, under single exclusivity, MA and
R1 must jointly obtain at least what they could get by deviating to pairwise exclusivity, that is:
MA R1  maxqA1 [P (qA1; q

B2)  c] qA1: (13)
To see this, it su¢ ces to note that MA or R1 (depending on whether manufacturers or retailers
make o¤ers) could otherwise protably deviate to a forcing contract (q^A1; T^A1), where
q^A1  arg max
qA1
[P (qA1; q

B2)  c] qA1:
This would increase the joint prot of MA and R1, and the xed fee T^A1 could be adjusted so
as to increase both partiesprots, thereby ensuring that the o¤er will be accepted, and that
the deviation is protable.43
This, in turn, implies that the pair MA   R1 obtains indeed more under single exclusivity
than under pairwise exclusivity:
MA R1  maxqA1 [P (qA1; q

B2)  c] qA1
> max
qA1
[P (qA1; q

B2)  c] qA1 = MA R1 ;
where the second inequality follows from (A:1) and (P:2), which implies qB2 < q

B2.
43When the manufacturers are the proposers, R1 may nd it protable to combine MAs deviant o¤er with
the equilibrium contract o¤ered by MB . If so, this can only increase R1s incentive to accept MAs deviant o¤er,
without a¤ecting MAs deviation prot. (The issue does not arise when the retailers are the proposers, as by
assumption an exclusive dealing provision prevents MA from dealing with R2.)
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We now turn to part (ii) of Proposition 4. Using again (P:2), we have:
MB R2 =

2
>

2
>   MA R1 = MB R2 ;
where the second inequality follows from
MA R1 > 

MA R1 =

2
>

2
:
Hence, when MA deals exclusively with R1, MB and R2 obtain a larger joint prot if they, too,
engage in exclusive dealing.
F Proof of Proposition 5
We study here the adoption game introduced in Section 5.2. To x ideas, we assume that Mi
and Rh get the opportunity of negotiating an exclusivity provision in the rst stage, followed by
Mj and Rk in the second stage, where i 6= j 2 fA;Bg and h 6= k 2 f1; 2g.
We rst note that a single player gets to move at every node of the game; hence, by con-
struction, an equilibrium exists.
Second, in order to determine which agreements the negotiating rms will sign at any given
stage, it su¢ ces to keep track of the impact that these agreements will eventually have on the
negotiating partiesjoint prot:
 This is obvious in stage 2, regardless of whether manufacturers or retailers are the pro-
posers, as Mj or Rk can use a lump-sum transfer to share their joint prot in any way
they want.
 This also holds in stage 1, as the agreement signed by Mi and Rh (or the lack thereof)
a¤ects the joint prot of Mi and Rh only through the inuence that their own agreement
may have on the subsequent agreement signed by Mj or Rk in stage 2; in particular,
Mi and Rh cannot use their own agreement to improve their bargaining positionin the
subsequent negotiation, as they are not involved in that negotiation (also, by construction,
any lump-sum transfer agreed upon in stage 1 has no impact on the joint prot eventually
obtained by Mi and Rh at the end of stage 2).
Third, in stage 1, Mi and Rh can secure a joint prot equal to =2 by agreeing to deal
exclusively with each other (i.e., by combining exclusive distribution and single branding pro-
visions), which de facto imposes pairwise exclusivity. They can also secure this joint prot by
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simply signing an exclusive distribution agreement, as, from part (ii) of Proposition 4, this leads
Mj and Rk to sign an exclusive distribution agreement as well in stage 2.
Fourth, if instead Mi and Rh were to sign a single branding agreement in stage 1, then in
stage 2 Mj and Rk would not sign any exclusivity agreement, as they prefer any equilibrium
under single exclusivity (where they distribute both goods) to pairwise exclusivity. This, in
turn, implies that Mi and Rh do not sign a single branding agreement in stage 1, as doing so
would give them less prot than the joint prot =2 that they can secure, for example, by
signing an exclusive distribution agreement in stage 1.
Finally, consider a candidate equilibrium in which Mi and Rh do not adopt any exclusivity
provision in stage 1. In stage 2, Mj and Rk will not sign a single branding contract, neither on a
stand-alone basis nor combined with an exclusive distribution agreement, as this is dominated by
signing only an exclusive distribution agreement: By doing so, they end-up in a single exclusivity
situation where Rk distributes both goods, whereas Rh distributes only Mis product; from
Proposition 4, they thereby obtain a larger joint prot than (i) in the other single exclusivity
situation where Rk is the retailer distributing a single product, and (ii) in the pairwise exclusivity
situation (which is reached through adoption of both single branding and exclusive distribution
provisions). It follows that, in stage 2, Mj and Rk will either adopt no exclusivity provision,
or sign an exclusive distribution agreement. But in both cases, the resulting outcomes give Mi
and Rh a lower joint prot than =2, which they can secure by signing among themselves an
exclusive distribution agreement in stage 1.
Summing-up, there exists an equilibrium, and all equilibria yield pairwise exclusivity either
each pair successively signs an exclusive distribution agreement, or the rst pair adopts both
single branding and exclusive distribution provisions.
Note that these insights apply as well when single branding is ruled out, i.e., when rms can
adopt only exclusive distribution agreements. As noted above, in that case the rst pair obtains
a joint prot of =2 if it signs an exclusive distribution agreement in stage 1, as this leads
the other pair to do the same in stage 2. If instead the rst pair does not sign an exclusive
distribution agreement in stage 1, then in stage 2:
 Either the other pair responds by adopting no exclusivity provision as well; but this cannot
be an equilibrium, as from Proposition 4, at least one pair would benet from switching
to an exclusive distribution agreement, regardless of whether the other pair does the same
or not.
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 Or the other pair responds by signing an exclusive distribution agreement; but this cannot
be an equilibrium either, as the rst pair then obtains less than =2, which it could
obtain by signing an exclusive distribution agreement in stage 1.
G Proof of Proposition 6
As Q > Q, to show that consumer surplus is greater in the absence of exclusive dealing, it
su¢ ces to note that S (Q;Q) increases with Q:
dS (Q;Q)
dQ
=  2Q [@1P (Q;Q) + @2P (Q;Q)] ;
which is positive from (A:1).
Exclusive dealing also harms welfare, as W (Q;Q) increases with Q as long as P (Q;Q) > c:
dW (Q;Q)
dQ
= P (Q;Q)  c+
Z Q
0
@2P (q;Q)dq + P (Q; 0)  c
= P (Q;Q)  c+
Z Q
0
@2P (Q; q)dq + P (Q; 0)  c
= 2 [P (Q;Q)  c] ;
where the second equality follows from the fact that demand symmetry implies that @2P (q;Q) 
@2P (Q; q). To conclude the argument, it su¢ ces to note that P (Q;Q) is decreasing in Q from
(A:1), and that P (Q; Q) > c.
H Proof of Proposition 7
To prove Proposition 7, consider the hypothetical Cournot duopoly where rm 1 produces both
goods A and B at marginal cost c whereas rm 2 produces good A at marginal cost c^ and good
B at marginal cost c. The equilibrium aggregate quantities,

Q^A (c^) ; Q^B (c^)

, are a solution to:
Q^A (c^) = R^

Q^B (c^) ; c^

; (14)
Q^B (c^) = R

Q^A (c^)

; (15)
where from Assumption (B) the aggregate best responses R^ and R each have a slope that lies
between  1 and 0, and the best response R^ moreover decreases as c^ increases.
Note that (Q; Q) =

Q^A (c) ; Q^B (c)

and (QA; Q

B) =

Q^A (c^
) ; Q^B (c^)

, where
c^  P (QA; QB) + @2P (QB; QA)qB2:
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is the cost level which leads rm 2 to stop selling good A. To see this, note that, in the hypo-
thetical Cournot duopoly: (i) rm 1 behaves as in the asymmetric duopoly setting introduced in
Section 3, and thus chooses (qA1; qB1) = (qA1; q

B1) in response to (qA2; qB2) = (0; q

B2); and (ii)
rm 2s behavior is characterized by the rst-order conditions (3) and (4) which, evaluated at
(qA1; qB1) = (q

A1; q

B1) and c^ = c^
, yield (qA2; qB2) = (0; qB2). We can thus interpret the move
from (Q; Q) to (QA; Q

B) as the evolution of the equilibrium

Q^A (c^) ; Q^B (c^)

as c^ increases
from c to c^.
We rst consider the e¤ect of single exclusivity on outputs. Di¤erentiating (14) and (15)
with respect to Q^A, Q^B and c^ yields:
dQ^A   @1R^

Q^B; c^

dQ^B = @2R^

Q^B; c^

dc^;
dQ^B = R
0

Q^A

dQ^A;
and thus:
Q^0A (c^) =
@2R

Q^B (c^) ; c^

1  @1R^

Q^B (c^) ; c^

R0

Q^A (c^)
 < 0;
0 < Q^0B (c^) = R
0

Q^A (c^)

Q^0A (c^) <  Q^0A (c^) ;
where the inequalities follow from  1 < R0 < 0;  1 < @1R^ < 0 and @2R^ < 0. Hence, introducing
an exclusive dealing agreement on good A leads to a reduction in the output of good A and, to
a lesser extent, to an increase in the output of good B:
QA <
QA +Q

B
2
< Q < QB:
We now turn to the e¤ect of single exclusivity on social welfare. Recall that total welfare is
equal to
W (QA; QB) = U (QA; QB)  cQA   cQB;
where U (QA; QB) represents the gross consumer utility associated with consumption levels QA
and QB, and satises, for i 6= j 2 fA;Bg:
@U
@Qi
(QA; QB) = P (Qi; Qj) :
Hence:
@W
@Qi
(QA; QB) =
@U
@Qi
(QA; QB)  c = P (Qi; Qj)  c:
We now show that
W^ (c^) W

Q^A (c^) ; Q^B (c^)

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decreases as c^ increases. We have:
W^ 0 (c^) =
@W
@QA

Q^A (c^) ; Q^B (c^)

Q^0A (c^) +
@W
@QB

Q^A (c^) ; Q^B (c^)

Q^0B (c^)
=
h
P

Q^A (c^) ; Q^B (c^)

  c
i
Q^0A (c^) +
h
P

Q^B (c^) ; Q^A (c^)

  c
i
Q^0B (c^)

h
P

Q^A (c^) ; Q^B (c^)

  c
i
Q^0A (c^) 
h
P

Q^B (c^) ; Q^A (c^)

  c
i
Q^0A (c^)
=
h
P

Q^A (c^) ; Q^B (c^)

  P

Q^B (c^) ; Q^A (c^)
i
Q^0A (c^) ;
where the inequality uses P^B > c and 0 < Q^0B (c^) <  Q^0A (c^). As Q^0A (c^) < 0, to conclude the
argument, it thus su¢ ces to establish that P^A < P^B; we have:
d
dc^

P^A   P^B

=
h
@1P

Q^A (c^) ; Q^B (c^)

  @2P

Q^B (c^) ; Q^A (c^)
i
Q^0A (c^)
 
h
@1P

Q^B (c^) ; Q^A (c^)

  @2P

Q^A (c^) ; Q^B (c^)
i
Q^0B (c^)
> 0;
where the inequality stems from Q^0B (c^) > 0 > Q^
0
A (c^) and (A:1) which, using symmetry,
implies @1P (Qi; Qj) < @2P (Qj ; Qi) = @2P (Qi; Qj).44 As P^A = P^B = P  for c^ = c, it follows
that P^A > P^B for any c^ > c.
Hence, under Assumption (B), introducing an exclusive dealing agreement decreases welfare.
From (P:2), doing so however increases industry prot; it follows that it reduces consumer
surplus.
I Proof of Proposition 8
To establish existence, consider a candidate equilibrium in which the two integrated rms do
not o¤er any contracts to each other, i.e., A2 = ? and B1 = ?, and sell (qA1; qA2; qB1; qB2) =
(Q; 0; 0; Q). To show that there is no protable deviation, suppose for instance that the
integrated MA  R1 deviates so as to induce a quantity q^A2. By assumption, MB  R2 does not
o¤er any contract to MA   R1 in the candidate equilibrium, and thus we still have q^B1 = 0,
as in the candidate equilibrium. The resulting quantities, ~qA1(q^A2; 0) and ~qB2(0; q^A2), are the
equilibrium quantities in game   when q^B1 = 0.
We now show that MB   R2 can guarantee itself at least the candidate equilibrium prot
=2  (Q; Q)=2 by simply rejecting MA   R1s deviant o¤er. Indeed, by doing so it
44Demand symmetry implies @2P (Q;Q0) = @2P (Q0; Q) (= @12U (Q;Q0), where U (; ) denotes consumersgross
surplus), and thus @212P (Q;Q
0) = @222P (Q
0; Q), for all Q and Q0.
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would obtain:
max
qB2
2 (0; qB2; ~qA1(q^A2; 0); 0) :
But ( :3) implies ~qA1(q^A2; 0)  ~qA1(0; 0) = qA1; as the prot of MB   R2 decreases in qA1, the
above prot is at least equal to:
max
qB2
2 (0; qB2; q

A1; 0) =

2
:
Therefore, in order to be protable, the deviation must increase the aggregate prot:
~ (q^A2; 0) > (Q
; Q) = ~ (0; 0) :
But this contradicts (P:2).
To establish uniqueness, suppose instead that there exists another equilibrium (q^A1; q^A2; q^B1; q^B2) 6=
(Q; 0; 0; Q). This implies, in particular, that q^A2 > 0 or q^B1 > 0. Furthermore, by construc-
tion we have q^A1 = ~qA1 (q^A2; q^B1) and q^B2 = ~qB2 (q^B1; q^A2), and the aggregate equilibrium prot
is ~ (q^A2; q^B1). It follows from ( :2) that this aggregate prot is lower than ~ (0; 0) = .
Hence, the equilibrium prot of at least one integrated rm, say MA   R1, must therefore be
strictly less than =2.
Consider rst the case where manufacturers are the proposers and suppose that MA   R1
deviates by o¤ering no contract to MB   R2, implying qA2 = 0. Given the quantity qB1  0 of
good B thatMB R2 expects R1 to sell in the continuation equilibrium, the other quantities are
q^DA1 = ~qA1 (0; qB1) and q^
D
B2 = ~qB2 (qB1; 0). Property ( :3) implies ~qB2(qB1; 0)  ~qB2(0; 0) = Q.
As MA  R1s deviation prot decreases with qB2, it is bounded from below by  (Q; Q) =2,
a contradiction.
A similar reasoning applies to the case where retailers are the proposers. IfMA R1 deviates
by o¤ering no contract to MB   R2, implying qB1 = 0. Given the quantity qA2  0 of good
A that MB   R2 expects MA to pick in the continuation equilibrium, the other quantities are
q^DA1 = ~qA1 (qA2; 0) and q^
D
B2 = ~qB2 (0; qA2)  ~qB2(0; 0) = Q, implying that the deviation prot
is at least  (Q; Q) =2, a contradiction.
J Proof of Proposition 9
We rst consider the case where manufacturers are the proposers, before turning to the other
case.
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J.1 Manufacturers as Proposers
J.1.1 Candidate equilibrium
We establish the existence of the following equilibrium:
 MA o¤ers R2 a forcing contract,

q^; T^

, whereas MB o¤ers R1 a (cost-based) forcing
contract, (qB1; T

B1), and o¤ers R2 to supply any quantity at cost (i.e., B2(q) = cq, for
any q  0).
 R2 is indi¤erent between accepting both MAs and MBs contracts, or either one of them,
and rejects MAs o¤er;
 R1 is indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting MBs contract, and accepts it.
By construction, the equilibrium quantities are the same as in the asymmetric Cournot
duopoly introduced in Section 3, and the equilibrium prots are equal to:
MA R1 = [P (q

A1; q

B1 + q

B2)  c] qA1 + P (qB1 + qB2; qA1) qB1   T B1;
R2 = [P (q

B1 + q

B2; q

A1)  c] qB2;
MB = T

B1   cqB1:
Determination of T B1 In equilibrium, R1 must be indi¤erent between rejecting or accepting
MBs o¤er:
 R1 should not benet from rejecting the o¤er, otherwise it would do so;
 conversely, if R1 were strictly better o¤ accepting the o¤er, thenMB could slightly increase
its fee: asMB is independent, this would not a¤ect R1s beliefs aboutMAs behavior (that
is, R1s wary beliefs boil down to passive beliefs), and thus R1 would accept MBs deviant
o¤er, making the deviation protable.
If R1 rejects MBs o¤er, it then sells ~qA1 units of good A, where:
~qA1  arg max
qA1
[P (qA1; q

B2)  c] qA1;
and thus obtains a prot equal to:
~MA R1  [P (~qA1; qB2)  c] ~qA1:
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Therefore, the fee T B1 is such that 

MA R1 = ~MA R1 , or:
T B1 = [P (q

A1; q

B1 + q

B2)  c] qA1 + P (qB1 + qB2; qA1) qB1   [P (~qA1; qB2)  c] ~qA1:
This in particular ensures that MBs equilibrium prot is non-negative:
MB = T

B1   cqB1
= [P (qA1; q

B1 + q

B2)  c] qA1 + [P (qB1 + qB2; qA1)  c] qB1   [P (~qA1; qB2)  c] ~qA1
= max
qA1;qB1
f[P (qA1; qB1 + qB2)  c] qA1 + [P (qB1 + qB2; qA1)  c] qB1g
 max
qA1
[P (qA1; qB1 + q

B2)  c] qA1
 0: (16)
Determination of

q^; T^

The described equilibrium is such that R2 can also obtain its
equilibrium prot R2 by accepting only MAs contract

q^; T^

, and by dealing with both
manufacturers. As MB o¤ers R2 to supply any quantity at cost, this in turn requires q^ to
be large enough so as to ensure that, conditional on selling q^ units of good A, R2 does not
want to sell good B. Assumptions (A:1) and (A:2) ensure that such large values exist for q^.
As R2 would obtain P (qA1 + q^; q

B1) q^   T^ by selecting MAs o¤er

q^; T^

instead of MBs
o¤er, we must have:
T^ = P (qA1 + q^; q

B1) q^   [P (qB1 + qB2; qA1)  c] qB2:
J.1.2 Deviations
The above characterization of equilibrium quantities and fees ensures that retailers have no
protable deviation, neither at the acceptance stage nor at the product market competition
stage. We thus now focus on manufacturersdeviations at the o¤er stage.
Deviations by MB Given the passive beliefs assumption, it su¢ ces to consider one-sided
deviations. Also, by construction such a one-sided deviation cannot be protable if it is not
accepted, as in equilibrium MB makes a non-negative prot with both R1 and R2.
Consider rst a deviant o¤er to R1. Such a deviation cannot reduce MA R1s payo¤, which
it can secure by rejecting MBs o¤er. But it cannot increase the joint prot that MB generates
with MA  R1 through R1s sales either, as the equilibrium contract o¤ered to R1 is bilaterally
e¢ cient.
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Consider now a deviant o¤er to R2. Again, such a deviation cannot reduce R2s payo¤, which
it can secure by rejecting MBs o¤er and accepting instead MAs o¤er. And it cannot increase
the joint prot that MB generates with R2 either, as the equilibrium contract o¤ered to R2 is
bilaterally e¢ cient, regardless of whether R2 accepts or rejects MAs o¤er.
Deviations by MA R1  Consider rst a deviant o¤er by MA R1 that induces R2 to reject
it.
Suppose rst that, in the continuation equilibrium, R2 acceptsMBs o¤er. If R1 also accepts
MBs o¤er, then the continuation equilibrium quantities are (qA1; q

B1; q

B2);MA R1 thus obtains
its equilibrium prot, making the deviation unprotable. If instead R1 rejects MBs o¤er in the
continuation equilibrium then, from ( :3), R2 puts on the market a larger quantity qB2 =
~qB2 (0; 0) > q

B2 = ~qB2 (q

B1; 0), implying that MA   R1 obtains less than its equilibrium prot,
making the deviation unprotable.
Therefore, to be protable, the deviation must induce R2 to reject MBs o¤er. We can
distinguish two cases, depending on R1s acceptance decision of MBs o¤er:
 If R1, too, rejects MBs o¤er in the continuation equilibrium, then it chooses to sell qA1
units of good A so as to maximize
[P (qA1; 0)  c] qA1:
This ensures that the resulting price of good A satises pA = P (qA1; 0) > c. But then,
pB = P (0; qA1) > P (qA1; 0) > c by Assumption (A:1), which in turn implies that R2
would rather accept MBs o¤er and sell a positive quantity of good B, in contradiction
with R2s supposed rejection of MBs o¤er.
 If instead R1 accepts MBs o¤er in the continuation equilibrium, then it sells qB1 units of
good B and qaA1 units of good A so as to maximize
[P (qA1; q

B1)  c] qA1 + P (qB1; qA1) qB1   T B1:
By revealed preference, this must exceed the prot it could achieve by rejectingMBs o¤er
and selling only good A, which implies:
P (qB1; q
a
A1) q

B1  T B1 + maxqA1 [P (qA1; 0)  c] qA1   [P (q
a
A1; q

B1)  c] qaA1
> T B1 + maxqA1
[P (qA1; 0)  c] qA1   [P (qaA1; 0)  c] qaA1
 cqB1;
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where the strict inequality follows from Assumption (A:1) and the last inequality stems
from (16). Therefore, P (qB1; q
a
A1) > c, which again implies that R2 would rather accept
MBs o¤er and sell a positive quantity of good B, in contradiction with R2s supposed
rejection of MBs o¤er.
 Consider now a deviant o¤er by MA R1 that is accepted by R2 together with MBs o¤er.
Let q^A2 denote the quantity of good A sold by R2, and T^A2 the associated payment to MA,
in the continuation equilibrium.
Suppose rst that, in the continuation equilibrium, R1 also keeps accepting MBs o¤er. By
construction, MB still obtains its equilibrium prot, MB = T

B1   cqB1: Furthermore, by de-
viating from this continuation equilibrium and rejecting the o¤er, R2 can ensure itself a prot
equal to:
max
qB2
[P (qB1 + qB2; ~qA1 (q^A2; q

B1))  c] qB2:
Therefore, MA  R1s deviation prot cannot exceed
' (q^A2)  ~ (q^A2; qB1)  MB  maxqB2 [P (q

B1 + qB2; ~qA1 (q^A2; q

B1))  c] qB2:
From ( :4), we have:
' (q^A2)  ' (0)
= ~ (0; qB1)  MB  maxqB2 [P (q

B1 + qB2; ~qA1 (0; q

B1))  c] qB2
= ~ (0; qB1)  MB  maxqB2 [P (q

B1 + qB2; q

A1)  c] qB2
= ~ (0; qB1)  MB   [P (qB1 + qB2; qA1)  c] qB2
= ~ (0; qB1)  MB   R2
= MA R1 ;
where the second equality stems from ~qA1 (0; qB1) = q

A1 and the third one stems from ~qB2 (q

B1; 0) =
qB2. It follows that the deviation is not protable for MA  R1.
Remark 1 Applying this reasoning to a deviant o¤er equal to the equilibrium shadow o¤er
q^; T^

shows that, in equilibrium, MA  R1 strictly prefers that R2 rejects MAs o¤er.
Remark 2 The previous remark does not necessarily imply that o¤ering

q^; T^

is a dominated
strategy for MA   R1: this will indeed not be the case if there exists a qB1 (together with an
appropriate best response qA1) and a qB2 such that MA   R1 is better o¤ when R2 mistakenly
accepts

q^; T^

.
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Suppose now that, in the continuation equilibrium, R1 rejects MBs o¤er. The quantities
are then the same as in the equilibrium of game   for (q^A2 and) q^B1 = 0. We rst note that this
continuation equilibrium (referred to below with superscript c) is less protable forMA R1 than
the alternative equilibrium (referred to below with a superscript a) in which the quantities
are those of the equilibrium of game   for q^A2 = q^B1 = 0 (and MB supplies R2 at cost). To see
this, note that :
 MB makes the same prot in both equilibrium scenarios: cMB = aMB = 0.
 R2 does not make more prot in the alternative equilibrium than in the continuation
equilibrium, i.e.: cR2  aR2 . To show this, note rst that the continuation equilibrium
must give R2 at least the prot that it could secure by deviating and only accepting MBs
o¤er:
cR2  maxqB2 [P (qB2; q
c
A1)  c] qB2:
But the right-hand side (weakly) exceeds
aR2 = maxqB2
[P (qB2; q
a
A1)  c] qB2;
as qaA1 = ~qA1 (0; 0)  qcA1 = ~qA1 (0; q^A2), from Property ( :3). Hence, cR2  aR2 .
 Property ( :2) ensures that the aggregate prot is larger in the alternative equilibrium
than in the continuation equilibrium:
aMB + 
a
MA R1 + 
a
R2  cMB + cMA R1 + cR2 :
It follows that the integrated rm makes more prot in the alternative equilibrium than in
the continuation equilibrium:
aMA R1  cMA R1 :
But aMA R1 < ~MA R1 = maxqA1 [P (qA1; q

B2)  c] qA1, as R2 is more aggressive in the alter-
native equilibrium than in the pseudo duopoly scenario in which R1 carries A only and R2
carries B only, but R2 anticipates that R1 is also carrying B, and thus sells qB2 = ~qB2 (q

B1; 0)
rather than qB2 = ~qB2 (0; 0). As ~MA R1 = 

MA R1 , we have:
cMA R1  aMA R1  MA R1 :
That is, MA  R1s deviation is not protable.
 Finally, consider now a deviation by MA  R1 that induces R2 to drop MBs o¤er.
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As R2 can costlessly acceptMBs o¤er to supply at cost, and then choose qB2 = 0, the above
reasoning (for deviations inducing R2 to accept the deviant o¤er by MA as well as MBs o¤er)
still applies, which concludes the proof.
J.2 Retailers as Proposers
J.2.1 Existence
We establish the existence of the following equilibrium:
 R1 o¤ers MB a (cost-based) forcing contract, (qB1; cqB1), which MB accepts.
 R2 o¤ers no contract to MA and o¤ers MB a (cost-based) forcing contract, (qB2; cqB2),
which MB accepts.
As before, the equilibrium quantities are the same as in the asymmetric Cournot duopoly
introduced in Section 3. The equilibrium prots are equal to:
MA R1 = [P (q

A1; q

B1 + q

B2)  c] qA1 + [P (qB1 + qB2; qA1)  c] qB1;
R2 = [P (q

B1 + q

B2; q

A1)  c] qB2;
MB = 0:
Clearly, MB cannot benet from rejecting any of the o¤ers. Likewise, the integrated rm
cannot protably deviate by o¤ering a di¤erent contract (or no contract) to MB, and R2 cannot
protably deviate by simply o¤ering a di¤erent contract (or no contract) to MB without also
making an o¤er to MA   R1. Hence, we have to check only for deviations where R2 o¤ers a
contract to MA  R1.
Without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to deviations in which R2 o¤ers a forcing
contract (q^A2; T^A2) to MA R1 and a cost-based forcing contract (~qB2(q^A2; qB1); c~qB2(q^A2; qB1))
to MB. Note that, in the continuation equilibrium, MB keeps accepting MA  R1s equilibrium
o¤er, (qB1; cq

B1).
 Having wary beliefs, the integrated MA   R1 is willing to accept this deviant o¤er if and
only ifh
T^A2   cq^A2
i
+ ~1(q^A2; q

B1)
 max
qA1
f[P (qA1; qB1 + ~qB2(q^A2; qB1))  c] qA1 + [P (qB1 + ~qB2(q^A2; qB1); qA1)  c] qB1g ;(17)
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where the right-hand side is the maximum that MA   R1 can get by rejecting the o¤er
(thereby taking R2 by surprise). The optimal deviation by R2 is such that this inequality
holds with equality (as, otherwise, R2 would do better by slightly lowering T^A2).
 This deviation is protable for R2 if and only if
~2(q^A2; q

B1) 
h
T^A2   cq^A2
i
> ~2(0; q

B1): (18)
Adding-up (17) and (18) yields
~(q^A2; q

B1) maxqA1 f[P (qA1; q

B1 + ~qB2 (q

B1; q^A2))  c] qA1 + [P (qB1 + ~qB2 (qB1; q^A2) ; qA1)  c] qB1g
> ~2(0; q

B1):
But by ( :4), the left-hand side is maximized at q^A2 = 0, where it is equal to the right-hand
side; hence, the deviation cannot be protable.
J.2.2 Uniqueness
We now show that, under a mild regularity condition, there does not exist an equilibrium with
cross-selling between MA and R2. To see this, consider a candidate equilibrium

 eij

i=A;B;j=1;2
inducing quantities

qeij

i=A;B;j=1;2
such that qeA2 > 0. In equilibrium, (i) MB must supply
qeB1 at cost (as MB is willing to supply any quantity at cost, it is optimal for MA   R1 to set
 eB1 (q
e
B1) = cq
e
B1), and (ii) MA must be indi¤erent between accepting R2s contract o¤er and
not (if MA were to prefer strictly accepting the o¤er, R2 would have an incentive to worsen the
terms). Hence, the integrated MA  R1s equilibrium prot must satisfy
eMA R1 = maxqA1
f[P (qA1; qeB1 + qeB2)  c] qA1 + [P (qeB1 + qeB2; qA1)  c] qeB1g :
At the same time, MA   R1 must not have an incentive to deviate by (i) changing its contract
o¤er to MB at the rst stage and then (ii) rejecting R2s contract o¤er and adjusting its own
downstream output qA1 at the second stage. As MB is willing to supply any quantity qB1 at
cost, we must have
eMA R1  maxqA1;qB1 f[P (qA1; qB1 + q
e
B2)  c] qA1 + [P (qB1 + qeB2; qA1)  c] qB1g :
Combining these two conditions yields:
max
qA1
f[P (qA1; qeB1 + qeB2)  c] qA1 + [P (qeB1 + qeB2; qA1)  c] qeB1g
 max
qA1;qB1
f[P (qA1; qB1 + qeB2)  c] qA1 + [P (qB1 + qeB2; qA1)  c] qB1g :
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However, MA  R1 equilibrium quantities must also satisfy
(qeA1; q
e
B1) 2 maxqA1;qB1 f[P (qA1 + q
e
A2; qB1 + q
e
B2)  c] qA1 + [P (qB1 + qeB2; qA1 + qeA2)  c] qB1g
We thus must have:
max
qB1
' (qB1; 0) = max
qB1
' (qB1; q
e
A2) ;
where
' (qB1; qA2)  max
qA1
f[P (qA1 + qeA2; qB1 + qeB2)  c] qA1 + [P (qB1 + qeB2; qA1 + qeA2)  c] qB1g :
If follows that qeA2 must be zero if arg maxqB1 ' (qB1; qA2) varies with qA2.
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Online Appendix
Not for publication
In this online Appendix, we provide regularity conditions on demand ensuring that the
various games considered in the paper have the desired properties. Section A studies the Cournot
duopoly games introduced in Section 3 of the paper and provides general conditions on demand
ensuring that these duopoly games satisfy Property (P:1). Section B provides an additional
condition on demand ensuring that these duopoly games also satisfy Property (P:2). Section C
turns to the hypothetical duopoly game introduced in Section 5.3 of the paper, and provides a
condition ensuring that this game satises Property (B). Finally, Section D considers the game
  introduced in Section 6.1 and provides general conditions on demand ensuring that this game
satises Properties ( :1)  ( :3).
A Cournot Duopoly
We consider three Cournot duopoly settings with di¤erentiated goods. In all variants there are
two goods, A and B, and two rms, 1 and 2:
 The goods are symmetrically di¤erentiated and the inverse demand for good i = A;B is
given by P (Qi; Qj), j 6= i 2 fA;Bg.1
 The two rms are perfectly substitutable, except possibly for their product portfolios.
The two goods are produced at the same constant unit cost c, but the di¤erent settings vary
in which rms can produce these goods. Specically, in the rst variant (studied in Section A.1
of the paper), one rm can only produce good A, and the other rm can only produce good B.
In the second variant (studied in Section A.2), both rms can produce both goods. Finally, in
the third variant (studied in Section A.3), rm 1 can still produce both goods, but rm 2 can
only produce good A.
Throughout the analysis, we maintain the two assumptions already introduced in the text:
(A:1) For any (QA; QB)  0,2
@1P (QA; QB)  @2P (QA; QB)  0;
1Demand symmetry implies @2P (Q;Q0) = @2P (Q0; Q) (= @12U (Q;Q0), where U (; ) denotes consumersgross
surplus), and thus @212P (Q;Q
0) = @222P (Q
0; Q), for all Q and Q0.
2Throughout the paper, @nf denotes the partial derivative of the function f with respect to its nth argument;
likewise, @2nmf will denote the second-order partial derivative with respect to the n
th and mth arguments.
1
with strict inequalities when P (QA; QB) > 0.
(A:2) P (0; 0) > c and, for Q su¢ ciently large, P (0; Q) < c.
Assumption (A:1) simply asserts that goods A and B are (imperfect) substitutes, whereas
(A:2) is essentially a viability assumption. We now show that, under additional regularity
conditions on demand, the three Cournot duopoly settings satisfy:
(P:1) In each of the three Cournot duopoly settings, there is a unique equilibrium, in which
all quantities are positive; in addition, whenever a rm sells both goods, the goods are
internalstrategic substitutes.3
A.1 Di¤erentiated Monoproduct-Firm Cournot Duopoly
In this section, we consider the setting in which one rm can only produce good A, and the
other rm can only produce good B. To ensure the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium,
we introduce the following assumption:
(A.3) For any (Qi; Qj)  0 such that P (Qi; Qj) > 0, we have
2@1P (Qi; Qj) + @
2
11P (Qi; Qj)Qi < @2P (Qi; Qj) + @
2
12P (Qi; Qj)Qi < 0:
Assumption (A:3) ensures that prot functions are concave and that rmsbest responses
have a slope that lies between  1 and 0; that is, rmsoutput decisions are strategic substitutes,
and the resulting equilibrium is stable. In the case of linear demand, (A:3) boils down to
@1P < @2P < 0, and is thus implied by (A:1). Together with the previous assumptions, it
ensures that the di¤erentiated monoproduct-rm Cournot duopoly satises Property (P:1):
Proposition 10 Consider the di¤erentiated monoproduct-rm Cournot duopoly in which rm
1, say, can produce good A at constant unit cost c, and rm 2 can produce good B at the
same unit cost c. Under Assumptions (A:1)   (A:3), there exists a unique equilibrium. The
equilibrium quantities (qA1; q

B2) are moreover symmetric, positive and characterized by the rst-
order conditions: qA1 = q

B2 = Q
 > 0, where Q is the unique solution to
Q 2 arg max
Q
[P (Q;Q)  c]Q
3That is, the prot  of a rm, as a function of its quantities qA and qB , is such that @2=@qA@qB  0, with
a strict inequality whenever the price of at least one good is positive.
2
and is uniquely characterized by the rst-order condition:
P (Q; Q)  c+ @1P (Q; Q)Q = 0:
Proof. The equilibrium quantities are solutions to, for i 6= j 2 fA;Bg:
Qi 2 arg max
Qi

P (Qi; Q

j )  c

Qi:
From (A:1), the prot of the producer of good i is strictly concave as long as the price of good
i is positive, and its best-response, Qi = ^(Qj), satises the rst-order condition
	 (Qi; Qj)
8<:  0 if Qi = 0;= 0 if Qi > 0;
where
	 (Qi; Qj)  P (Qi; Qj)  c+ @1P (Qi; Qj)Qi:
We have 	(0; Qj) = P (0; Qj)   c, @1	(Qi; Qj) = 2@1P (Qi; Qj) + @211P (Qi; Qj)Qi  0 (with
strict inequality if P (Qi; Qj) > 0) by (A:1), and 	(Qi; Qj) < 0 for Qi su¢ ciently large by
(A:2). Hence, the best-response ^(Qj) is given by ^(Qj) = 0 if P (0; Qj)  c, and by the unique
solution to 	(^(Qj); Qj) = 0 otherwise. Furthermore, from (A:2), 	(0; 0) > 0 and 	(Q; 0) < 0
for Q su¢ ciently large. Therefore, ^ (0) > 0. Finally, as long as ^ (Q) > 0, we have:
^0(Qj) =  @2	(Qi; Qj)
@1	(Qi; Qj)
=   @2P (Qi; Qj) + @
2
12P (Qi; Qj)Qi
2@1P (Qi; Qj) + @211P (Qi; Qj)Qi
;
which by (A:3) satises  1 < ^0 () < 0. It follows there there exists a unique equilibrium, which
is moreover symmetric and involves positive quantities: QA = Q

B = Q
, the unique solution
to 	 (Q; Q) = 0.
A.2 Multiproduct-Firm Cournot Duopoly
In this section, we consider the setting in which both rms can produce both goods. To ensure the
existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in this setting, we introduce the following assumption:
(A.4) For any (Qi; Qj)  0 such that P (Qi; Qj) > 0, and for any qi 2 [0; Qi] and any qj 2 [0; Qj ],
we have
2@1P (Qi; Qj) + @
2
11P (Qi; Qj) qi + @
2
22P (Qj ; Qi) qj
< @2P (Qi; Qj) + @2P (Qj ; Qi) + @
2
12P (Qi; Qj) qi + @
2
12P (Qj ; Qi) qj
< 0:
3
Assumption (A:4) further guarantees that prots remain concave when both rms can sell
goods A and B. In the case of linear demand, it boils down to @1P < @2P < 0, and is thus
implied by (A:1). Together with the previous assumptions, it ensure that the multiproduct-rm
Cournot duopoly satises Property (P:1):
Proposition 11 Consider the multiproduct-rm Cournot duopoly in which both rms can pro-
duce both goods A and B at constant unit cost c. Under Assumptions (A:1) (A:4), the two goods
are internal strategic substitutes, and there exists a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium quan-
tities (qA1; q

A2; q

B1; q

B2) are moreover positive and symmetric: for i 2 fA;Bg and h 2 f1; 2g,
qih = q
 > 0, where q is the unique solution to
q 2 arg max
q
[P (q + q; 2q)  c] q + [P (2q; q + q)  c] q
and is uniquely characterized by the rst-order condition:
P (2q; 2q)  c+ [@1P (2q; 2q) + @2P (2q; 2q)] q = 0: (1)
Proof. The equilibrium quantities are solutions to, for h 6= k 2 f1; 2g:
(qAh; q

Bh) 2 arg maxqAh;qBh h (qAh; qBh; q

Ak; q

Bk) ;
with
h (qAh; qBh; qAk; qBk)  [P (QA; QB)  c] qAh + [P (QB; QA)  c] qBh;
where Qi  qi1 + qi2 denotes the total output for good i. The second-order derivatives of
h (; ; ; ) are given by:
@211h (qAh; qBh; qAk; qBk) = 2@1P (qA + qAk; qB + qBk)
+@211P (qA + qAk; qB + qBk) qA + @
2
22P (qB + qBk; qA + qAk) qB;
@222h (qAh; qBh; qAk; qBk) = 2@1P (qB + qBk; qA + qAk)
+@211P (qB + qBk; qA + qAk) qB + @
2
22P (qA + qAk; qB + qBk) qA;
@212h (qAh; qBh; qAk; qBk) = @2P (qA + qAk; qB + qBk) + @2P (qB + qBk; qA + qAk)
+@212P (qA + qAk; qB + qBk) qA + @
2
12P (qB + qBk; qA + qAk) qB:
It follows from (A:4) that:
 h (qAh; qBh; ; ) is strictly concave in (qAh; qBh); rst-order conditions are therefore nec-
essary and su¢ cient.
4
 @212h (qAh; qBh; ; )  0, with a strict inequality when the price of at least one good is
positive; hence, goods A and B are internal strategic substitutes.
We rst show that all quantities are positive, and then show that rst-order conditions
characterize a unique equilibrium.
 All equilibrium quantities are positive.
Suppose by contradiction that qB2, say, is zero.
Step 1: qB1 > 0. Suppose otherwise that q

B1 = 0. By construction, we then have:
qAh = arg maxqAh
[P (qAh + q

Ak; 0)  c] qAh:
Note that qA1 = 0 would imply p

A = P (q

A2; 0)  c, and thus qA2 = 0 as well;4 but this would
therefore require P (0; 0)  c, contradicting the viability condition (A:2). Thus, we can assume
that qA1 is positive, and thus satises rm 1s rst-order condition which, using
1 = [P (qA1 + q

A2; qB1)  c] qA1 + [P (qB1; qA1 + qA2)  c] qB1;
and qB1 = 0, is given by:
@1
@qA1

(qih)=(qih)
= P (QA; 0)  c+ @1P (QA; 0) qA1 = 0:
But then, a small increase in qB1 would increase rm 1s prot:
@1
@qB1

(qih)=(qih)
= P (0; QA)  c+ @2P (QA; 0) qA1
> P (QA; 0)  c+ @1P (QA; 0) qA1 = 0;
where the inequality stems from (A:1) (@2P > @1P , which also implies P (0; Q) > P (Q; 0) for
any Q > 0).
Step 2: qA2 > q

A1. From Step 1, q

B1 is positive and therefore satises the rst-order
condition
@1
@qB1

(qih)=(qih)
= P (QB; Q

A)  c+ @1P (QB; QA) qB1 + @2P (QA; QB) qA1 = 0: (2)
From (A:1), @1P  0 and @2P  0 and thus P (QB; QA)  c > 0; but (A:1) then implies
@1P (Q

B; Q

A) < 0, which in turn yields P (Q

B; Q

A) > c.
4Otherwise, a slight reduction in qA2 would increase R2s prot 2 = (p

A   c) qA2, since then
@2
@qA2

(qih)=(qih)
= pA   c+ qA2@1P (qA2; 0) < pA   c  0:
5
Using
2 = [P (q

A1 + qA2; q

B1 + qB2)  c] qA2 + [P (qB1 + qB2; qA1 + qA2)  c] qB2;
the rst-order condition for qB2 = 0 yields:
@2
@qB2

(qih)=(qih)
= P (QB; Q

A)  c+ @2P (QA; QB) qA2  0: (3)
Using (A:1) and P (QB; Q

A) > c, it follows that q

A2 is positive and thus satises the rst-order
condition
@2
@qA2

(qih)=(qih)
= P (QA; Q

B)  c+ @1P (QA; QB) qA2 = 0;
implying P (QA; Q

B) > c.
Subtracting (2) from (3) yields:
@2P (Q

A; Q

B) (q

A2   qA1)  @1P (QB; QA) qB1;
where @1PA < 0 and @2PB < 0 (from (A:1), as both prices are positive), and qB1 > 0 (from
Step 1); therefore, qA2 > q

A1.
Step 3: qA1 > 0. Suppose otherwise that q

A1 = 0. In that case, Q

A = q

A2 and Q

B = q

B1
satisfy QB = ^ (Q

A) and Q

A = ^ (Q

B), where the best response function
^ (Q)  arg max
Q^
nh
P

Q^;Q

  c
i
Q^
o
is characterized by the rst-order condition:
P (^ (Q) ; Q)  c+ @1P (^ (Q) ; Q) ^ (Q) = 0:
Assumption (A:3) ensures that this response function satises
 1 < ^0 (Q) < 0:
Therefore, we must have QA = Q

B = Q^
, where Q^ is such that Q^ = ^

Q^

, and thus satises:
P

Q^; Q^

  c+ @1P

Q^; Q^

Q^ = 0:
But then, each rm would want to sell the other good as well:
@1
@qA1

(qih)=(qih)
=
@2
@qB2

(qih)=(qih)
= P

Q^; Q^

  c+ @2P

Q^; Q^

Q^ > 0
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as P

Q^; Q^

> c from above, and thus @1P

Q^; Q^

< @2P

Q^; Q^

< 0 from (A:1). Hence,
qA1 > 0.
Step 4. It follows from the previous steps that qA2, q

A1 and q

B1 must all be positive, and
thus satisfy the rst-order conditions:
@1
@qA1

(qih)=(qih)
= P (QA; Q

B)  c+ @1P (QA; QB) qA1 + @2P (QB; QA) qB1 = 0; (4)
@1
@qB1

(qih)=(qih)
= P (QB; Q

A)  c+ @1P (QB; QA) qB1 + @2P (QA; QB) qA1 = 0; (5)
@2
@qA2

(qih)=(qih)
= P (QA; Q

B)  c+ @1P (QA; QB) qA2 = 0; (6)
whereas the rst-order condition for qB2 = 0 yields:
@2
@qB2

(qih)=(qih)
= P (QB; Q

A)  c+ @2P (QA; QB) qA2  0: (7)
Subtracting (6) from (4) and (5) from (7) yields:
 @1P (QA; QB) (qA2   qA1) =  @2P (QB; QA) qB1;
 @2P (QA; QB) (qA2   qA1)   @1P (QB; QA) qB1:
The rst condition yields qA2 > q

A1, and thus the two conditions can be rewritten as:
 @1P (QA; QB)
 @2P
 
QB; Q

A
 = qB1
qA2   qA1
  @2P (Q

A; Q

B)
 @1P
 
QB; Q

A
 :
This, in turn, implies
@1P (Q

A; Q

B) @1P (Q

B; Q

A)  @2P (QB; QA) @2P (QA; QB) ;
a contradiction as @1P < @2P < 0 from (A:1). Hence, there is no equilibrium in which qB2 = 0.
The equilibrium exists, is unique and symmetric.
It follows from the above analysis that all equilibrium quantities are positive and thus satisfy
the rst-order conditions. Adding the conditions for good A, namely:
@1
@qA1

(qih)=(qih)
= P (QA; Q

B)  c+ @1P (QA; QB) qA1 + @2P (QB; QA) qB1 = 0;
@2
@qA2

(qih)=(qih)
= P (QA; Q

B)  c+ @1P (QA; QB) qA2 + @2P (QB; QA) qB2 = 0;
implies that
P (QA; Q

B)  c > 0
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and (QA; Q

B) satisfy  (Q

A; Q

B) = 0, where
 (QA; QB)  2 [P (QA; QB)  c] + @1P (QA; QB)QA + @2P (QB; QA)QB: (8)
The derivatives of  are given by:
@1 (QA; QB) = 3@1P (QA; QB) + @11P (QA; QB)QA + @22P (QB; QA)QB;
@2 (QA; QB) = 2@2P (QA; QB) + @2P (QB; QA) + @
2
12P (QA; QB)QA + @21P (QB; QA)QB:
Assumptions (A:1)5 and (A:4) ensure that, as long as P (QA; QB) > 0:
@1 (QA; QB) < @2 (QA; QB) < 0:
In addition, Assumption (A:2) implies that  (0; 0) > 0 and Assumptions (A:1) and (A:2)
jointly imply that, for any QB  0,  (QA; QB) < 0 for QA su¢ ciently large. Therefore, for
any QB satisfying  (0; QB) > 0, the condition  (QA; QB) = 0 denes a unique aggregate
tting-in function, QA = ~ (QB), which has moreover a slope strictly comprised between  1
and 0.
The above analysis shows that the equilibrium quantities satisfy QA = ~ (Q

B). Likewise,
adding the rst-order conditions for good B yields P (QB; Q

A)  c > 0 and QB = ~ (QA). As
equilibrium quantities must be positive, it follows that there exists a unique equilibrium, which
is symmetric and such that QA = Q

B = Q
 = ~ (Q) > 0.
Finally, the rst-order conditions for the quantity chosen by rm h 2 f1; 2g yield:
 @1P (Q; Q) qAh   @2P (Q; Q) qBh = P (Q; Q)  c;
 @1P (Q; Q) qBh   @2P (Q; Q) qAh = P (Q; Q)  c:
Furthermore, Q satises P (QA; Q

B)  c > 0 and  (Q; Q) = 0, and thus:
P (Q; Q) = c  @1P (Q
; Q)Q + @2P (QB; QA)QB
2
> c:
Therefore, the individual quantities are also uniquely dened and symmetric:
qAh = q

Bh = q
    P (Q
; Q)  c
@1P (Q; Q) + @2P (Q; Q)
> 0:
5Using demand symmetry (see footnote 1), (A:1) implies @1P (QA; QB) < @2P (QA; QB) = @2P (QB ; QA).
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A.3 Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly
In this section, we consider the setting in which one rm can still produce both goods, whereas
the other rm can only produce good A. To ensure the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium
in this setting, we introduce the following additional assumption:
(A.5) For any (Qi; Qj)  0 such that P (Qi; Qj) > 0, and for any qj 2 [0; Qj ], we have
2@1P (Qi; Qj) + @
2
11P (Qi; Qj)Qi + @
2
22P (Qj ; Qi) (Qj   qj)
+@2P (Qj ; Qi)
@2P (Qj ; Qi) + @
2
12P (Qj ; Qi) qj
@1P (Qj ; Qi)
< @2P (Qi; Qj) + @
2
12P (Qi; Qj)Qi + @
2
12P (Qj ; Qi) (Qj   qj)
+@2P (Qj ; Qi)

1 +
@1P (Qj ; Qi) + @
2
11P (Qj ; Qi) qj
@1P (Qj ; Qi)

< 0:
In the case of linear demand, (A:5) boils down to 2@1P + (@2P )
2 =@1P < 3@2P < 0, and
is thus implied by (A:1).6 Together with the previous assumptions, it ensures that the
asymmetric Cournot duopoly satises Property (P:1):
Proposition 12 Consider the asymmetric Cournot duopoly in which rm 1, say, produces both
goods A and B at constant unit cost c, whereas rm 2 only produces good B, at the same unit
cost c. Under Assumptions (A:1) (A:5), the two goods are internal strategic substitutes for rm
1, and there exists a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium quantities (qA1; q

B1; q

B2) are moreover
positive and uniquely characterized by the rst-order conditions:
P (QA; Q

B)  c+ @1P (QA; QB)qA1 + @2P (QA; QB)qB1 = 0;
P (QB; Q

A)  c+ @1P (QB; QA)qB1 + @2P (QB; QA)qA1 = 0;
P (QB; Q

A)  c+ @1P (QB; QA)qB2 = 0:
Proof. The equilibrium quantities are solutions to:
(qA1; q

B1) 2 arg maxqA1;qB1 [P (qA1; qB1 + q

B2)  c] qA1 + [P (qB1 + qB2; qA1)  c] qB1;
6That 2@1P + (@2P )
2 =@1P < 0 and 3@2P < 0 derives directly from (A.2). Furthermore:2@1P + (@2P )2@1P
 > 3 j@2P j () 3 @2P@1P
 < 2 + @2P@1P
2
;
where the last inequality holds for @2P=@1P 2 (0; 1).
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and
qB2 2 arg maxqB2 [P (q

B1 + qB2; q

A1)  c] qB2:
The prots of the two rms are again strictly concave from (A:4), and the rst order conditions
are given by:
P (QA; Q

B)  c+ @1P (QA; QB)qA1 + @2P (QA; QB)qB1  0;
P (QB; Q

A)  c+ @1P (QB; QA)qB1 + @2P (QB; QA)qA1  0;
P (QB; Q

A)  c+ @1P (QB; QA)qB2  0;
where the rst-order condition of quantity qik holds with equality if q

ik > 0, and where Q

A  qA1
and QB  qB1 + qB2.
We rst show that all quantities are positive, and then show that rst-order conditions
characterize a unique equilibrium.
 All equilibrium quantities are positive.
Step 1: P (QB; Q

A) > c. To see this, suppose otherwise that P (Q

B; Q

A)  c. Then, the
rst-order condition of qB2 implies that q

B2 = 0. Moreover, we must also have q

B1 = 0; if not,
rm 1 could protably deviate by reducing qB1. Hence, QB = 0  QA. By (A:1), we thus have
P (QA; Q

B)  c, implying that qA1 = 0 (otherwise, rm 1 could protably deviate by reducing
qA1). Hence, P (0; 0)  c, contradicting (A:2).
Step 2: qB2 > 0. As P (Q

B; Q

A) > c, rm 2 could otherwise protably deviate by choosing
qB2 > 0 small enough such that P (QB + qB2; Q

A) > c.
Step 3: P (QA; Q

B) > c. To see this, suppose otherwise that P (Q

A; Q

B)  c. It follows that
qA1 = 0. (If not, rm 1 could protably deviate by setting qA1 = 0; if q

B1 = 0, rm 1 could
combine this deviation with some qB1 > 0 su¢ ciently small such that P (QB+qB1; Q

A qA1) > c.)
Hence, QA = 0  QB. By (A:1), we thus have P (QA; QB)  P (QB; QA) > c, a contradiction.
Step 4: qA1 > 0. Suppose otherwise that q

A1 = 0. We have:
0  P (QA; QB)  c+ @2P (QA; QB)qB1
> P (QB; Q

A)  c+ @1P (QB; QA)qB1;
where the rst inequality follows from qA1 = 0, and the second by (A:1) and Q

B > Q

A. It
follows that qB1 = 0. But as P (Q

B; Q

A) > c, rm 1 could then protably deviate by setting
qB1 > 0 su¢ ciently small such that P (QB + qB1; Q

A) > c.
Step 5: qB1 > 0. Suppose otherwise that q

B1 = 0. The induced outcome thus coincides with
the equilibrium outcome in a duopoly in which rm 1 sells only good A and rm 2 sells only
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good B. Under Assumption (A:3), this implies that QA = Q

B, as shown in Proposition 10. We
thus have:
P (QB; Q

A)  c+ @2P (QB; QA)QA > P (QA; QB)  c+ @1P (QA; QB)QA = 0;
where the inequality follows from (A:1) and the equality from the rst-order condition of qA1 =
QA. But then rm 1 could protably deviate by slightly raising qB1.
The equilibrium exists and is unique.
All quantities (qA1; q

B1; q

B2) are therefore strictly positive, implying that each of the three
rst-order conditions holds with equality; that is (using QA = q

A1):
P (QA; Q

B)  c+ @1P (QA; QB)QA + @2P (QB; QA)qB1 = 0; (9)
P (QB; Q

A)  c+ @1P (QB; QA)qB1 + @2P (QA; QB)QA = 0; (10)
P (QB; Q

A)  c+ @1P (QB; QA)qB2 = 0: (11)
Adding equations (10) and (11), we obtain (QB; Q

A) = 0, where the function  is dened
by (8). Therefore, QB = ~ (Q

A).
Equation (10) yields qB2 = qB2 (Q

A; Q

B), where:
qB2 (QA; QB)  min

max

 P (QB; QA)  c
@1P (QB; QA)
; 0

; QB

;
which is continuous in QA and QB, and such that:
@1qB2 (QA; QB) =  @2P (QB; QA) + @
2
12P (QB; QA) qB2 (QA; Q)
@1P (QB; QA)
;
@2qB2 (QA; QB) =  @1P (QB; QA) + @
2
11P (QB; QA) qB2 (QA; QB)
@1P (QB; QA)
;
whenever qB2 (:) lies strictly between 0 and QB. Plugging this into (9) yields A(Q

A; Q

B) = 0,
where:
A (QA; QB) = P (QA; QB)  c+ @1P (QA; QB)QA + @2P (QB; QA) (QB   qB2 (QA; QB)) :
Whenever qB2 (:) is di¤erentiable (which is almost everywhere), A is also di¤erentiable and its
derivatives are given by:
@1A (Q

A; QB) = 2@1P (QA; QB) + @
2
11P (QA; QB)QA
+@222P (QB; QA) (QB   qB2 (QA; QB))  @2P (QB; QA) @1qB2 (QA; QB) ;
@2A (QA; QB) = @2P (QA; QB) + @
2
12P (QA; QB)QA
+@212P (QB; QA) (QB   qB2 (QA; QB)) + @2P (QB; QA) (1  @2qB2 (QA; QB)) :
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Assumptions (A:3) (for the case when qB2 () = QB), (A:4) (when qB2 () = 0) and (A:5) (when
0 < qB2 () < QB) ensure that, as long as P (QA; QB) > 0, @1A (QA; QB) < @2A (QA; QB) < 0.
In addition, Assumption (A:2) implies that A (0; 0) > 0 and Assumptions (A:1) and (A:2)
jointly imply that, for any QB  0, A (QA; QB) < 0 for QA su¢ ciently large. Therefore, for
any QB satisfying A (0; QB) > 0, the condition A (QA; QB) = 0 denes a unique aggregate
tting-in function, QA = ~A (QB), which has moreover a slope strictly comprised between  1
and 0.
Summing-up, the above analysis shows that the equilibrium aggregate quantities satisfy
QA = ~A (Q

B) and Q

B = ~ (Q

A), where ~ (:) and ~A (:) each has a slope lying between  1 and
0. It follows that there exists a unique quantity pair (QA; Q

B) such that Q

A > 0, Q

B > 0, and
QA = ~A (Q

B) and Q

B = ~ (Q

A). As equilibrium quantities must be positive, these constitute
the unique candidate equilibrium aggregate quantities. To conclude the proof, it su¢ ces to show
that individual quantities are also positive.
We rst note that A (Q

A; Q

B) = 0 and  (Q

B; Q

A) = 0 respectively imply P (Q

A; Q

B) > c
and P (QB; Q

A) > c. It follows that q

B2 = qB2 (Q

A; Q

B) > 0. Finally, showing that q

B1 >
0 amounts to establishing qB2 < Q

B. Suppose by contradiction that Q

B = q

B2. As q

B2 =
qB2 (Q

A; Q

B), this requires:
P (QB; Q

A)  c+ @1P (QB; QA)QB  0: (12)
Combining this with QB = ~ (Q

A), or  (Q

B; Q

A) = 0, this yields:
P (QB; Q

A)  c+ @2P (QA; QB)QA  0 (13)
= P (QA; Q

B)  c+ @1P (QA; QB)QA
< P (QA; Q

B)  c+ @2P (QA; QB)QA;
where the equality stems from A(Q

A; Q

B) = 0 (using q

B2 = Q

B) and the strict inequality
stems from QA > 0 and (A:1). It follows that
P (QA; Q

B) > P (Q

B; Q

A) ;
and thus
QA < Q

B:
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But then, we obtain a contradiction to (13), as:
0  P (QB; QA)  c+ @1P (QB; QA)QB
< P (QB; Q

A)  c+ @2P (QB; QA)QA
= P (QB; Q

A)  c+ @2P (QA; QB)QA;
where the rst inequality comes from (12), the strict inequality stems from QA < Q

B and (A:1),
and the equality derives from @2P (QB; QA) = @2P (QA; QB).
B Property (P:2)
We conclude this Online Appendix by showing that the Cournot duopoly games introduced
in Section 3 of the paper satisfy Property (P:2) under an additional regularity conditions on
demand, namely:
(B:4) For any (Qi; Qj)  0 such that P (Qi; Qj) > 0, we have
@2P (Qi; Qj)

@211P (Qi; Qj)Qi + @
2
22P (Qj ; Qi)Qj

 @1P (Qi; Qj)

@212P (Qi; Qj)Qi + @
2
12P (Qj ; Qi)Qj

:
This condition is satised when for instance demand is linear. We have:
Proposition 13 The three Cournot duopoly settings considered in Section A satisfy the follow-
ing properties:
 Under Assumptions (A:1)  (A:5) and (B:1)  (B:3), the equilibrium industry prots are
such that:  >  > .
 Under Assumptions (A:1)  (A:4), the equilibrium aggregate outputs are such that: Q <
Q.
 Under Assumptions (A:1)  (A:5) and (B:1)  (B:2), a monoproduct rm sells less when
its rival produces both goods (asymmetric duopoly) than when it produces a single good
(di¤erentiated monoproduct-rm duopoly): qB1 > q

B1.
Proof. To establish the rst result, we start by noting that, from Proposition 12, Assump-
tions (A:1)  (A:5) imply qB1 > 0. Therefore:
 = ~ (qB1; 0) > ~ (0; 0) = 
;
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where the inequality follows from ( :3), which, from Proposition 15, holds under (B:1)  (B:3).
It thus su¢ ces to show that  > .
Let

Q^A (c^) ; Q^B (c^)

denote the equilibrium outputs of the hypothetical duopoly game  ^
introduced in Section 5.3 of the paper, and studied in Section C of this Online Appendix, in
which rm 1 can produce both goods at cost c, whereas rm 2 can produce good A at cost c
and good B at cost c^ > c. As noted in the proof of Proposition 7, (Q; Q) =

Q^A (c) ; Q^B (c)

and (QA; Q

B) =

Q^A (c^
) ; Q^B (c^)

, where
c^  P (QA; QB) + @2P (QB; QA)qB2:
is the cost level which leads rm 2 to stop selling good A. We can thus interpret the move from
(Q; Q) to (QA; Q

B) as the evolution of the equilibrium

Q^A (c^) ; Q^B (c^)

as c^ increases from
c to c^. Furthermore, for c^ = c^, qA2 = 0 and thus the industry prot in the duopoly game
coincides with the trueindustry prot, based on the actual cost c:
 = ^ (c^) ;
where
^ (c^) 

P

Q^A (c^) ; Q^B (c^)

  c

Q^A (c^) +

P

Q^B (c^) ; Q^A (c^)

  c

Q^B (c^)
denotes the equilibrium industry prot, based on true costs, in the duopoly game  ^. As by
construction  = ^ (c), to establish  > , it su¢ ces to show that ^ (c^) increases with c^.
We have:
^0 (c^) =
h
P

Q^A; Q^B

  c+ @1P

Q^A; Q^B

Q^A + @2P

Q^B; Q^A

Q^B
i
Q^0A
+
h
P

Q^B; Q^A

  c+ @1P

Q^B; Q^A

Q^B + @2P

Q^A; Q^B

Q^A
i
Q^0B;
which, using the FOCs for R1s outputs q^A1 and q^B1:
P

Q^B; Q^A

  c+ @1P

Q^B; Q^A

q^B1 + @2P

Q^A; Q^B

q^A1 = 0;
P

Q^A; Q^B

  c+ @1P

Q^A; Q^B

q^A1 + @2P

Q^B; Q^A

q^B1 = 0;
can be written as:
^0 (c^) =
h
@1P

Q^A; Q^B

q^A2 + @2P

Q^B; Q^A

q^B2
i
Q^0A
+
h
@1P

Q^B; Q^A

q^B2 + @2P

Q^A; Q^B

q^A2
i
R0

Q^A

Q^0A
=
8<:
h
@1P

Q^A; Q^B

+ @2P

Q^A; Q^B

R0

Q^A
i
q^A2
+
h
@2P

Q^B; Q^A

+ @1P

Q^B; Q^A

R0

Q^A
i
q^B2
9=; Q^0A:
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The rst term within bracket is negative, as @1P

Q^A; Q^B

< @2P

Q^A; Q^B

< 0 andR0

Q^A

>
 1. Under (B:4), the aggregate best-response QB = R (QA) satises:
@2P (QB; QA) + @1P (QB; QA)R
0 (QA)  0: (14)
Hence, the second term within brackets is non-positive, as Q^0A < 0. It follows that ^
0 (c^) > 0.
We now turn to the second result. Recall that Q = q and Q = 2q are such that
Q = arg max
Q
[P (Q;Q)  c]Q;
Q
2
= arg max
q

P

Q
2
+ q;Q

  c

q +

P

Q;
Q
2
+ q

  c

Q
2
:
Hence, we have
[P (Q; Q)  c]Q  [P (Q; Q)  c]Q (15)
and
[P (Q; Q)  c]Q  [P (Q; Q)  c]

Q   Q

2

+ [P (Q; Q)  c] Q

2
= [P (Q; Q)  c]Q + [P (Q; Q)  P (Q; Q)] Q

2
:
If Q > Q, the last term on the RHS is positive from (A:2), implying
[P (Q; Q)  c]Q  [P (Q; Q)  c]Q: (16)
Combining (15) and (16) yields
[P (Q; Q)  P (Q; Q)]Q  [P (Q; Q)  P (Q; Q)]Q;
i.e., Z Q
Q
Q@2P (Q; Q)dQ 
Z Q
Q
Q@2P (Q; Q)dQ;
which is equivalent toZ Q
Q
Z Q
Q
h
@2P ( ~Q;Q) + ~Q@
2
12P ( ~Q;Q)
i
d ~QdQ  0:
(A:3) implies that the term in brackets is negative, a contradiction. Hence, we must have
Q  Q.
Suppose now for contradiction that Q = Q. The rst-order conditions of the above
maximization problems (for q = Qand q = Q=2) then yield:
P (Q; Q)  c =   [@1P (Q; Q) + @2P (Q; Q)] Q

2
=  @1P (Q; Q)Q;
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implying @1P (Q; Q) = @2P (Q; Q), and thus contradicting (A:2). Hence, we must have
Q < Q.
Finally the last result follows from Proposition 12, which shows that Assumptions (A:1)  
(A:5) imply qB1 > 0, and from Proposition 15, which shows that ( :2) holds under (B:1) (B:2);
therefore:
qB2 = ~qB2 (0; 0) > ~qB2 (q

B1; 0) = q

B2:
C Game  ^
We consider the hypothetical duopoly game, introduced in Section 5.3 of the paper, and which
we will refer to as Game  ^, in which rm 1, say, produces both goods at cost c, whereas the
other rm produces one good good A, say at cost c^  c, and the other good at cost c. We
provide a condition on demand ensuring that this game satises Property (B).
As shown in the text, the rst-order conditions allow us to dene an aggregate best-response
QA = R^ (QB; c^), implicitly characterized by the aggregate rst-order condition
2P (QA; QB)  c  c^+ @1P (QA; QB)QA + @2P (QB; QA)QB = 0; (17)
and another aggregate best-response QB = R (QA), implicitly characterized by
2P (QB; QA)  2c+ @1P (QB; QA)QB + @2P (QA; QB)QA = 0: (18)
We have:
Proposition 14 Under Assumptions (A:1) and (A:3):
 (B) For any Q > 0,  1 < R0 (Q)  0, with a strict inequality when R (Q) > 0,  1 <
@1R^ (Q; c^)  0; and @2R^ (Q; c^)  0, with strict inequalities when R^ (Q; c^) > 0.
Proof. Di¤erentiating (17) with respect to QA, QB and c^ yields
^AdQA + ^AdQB = dc^;
where
^i = 3@1P

~Qi; ~Qj

+ ~Qi@
2
11P

~Qi; ~Qj

+ ~Qj@
2
22P

~Qj ; ~Qi

;
^i = 2@2P

~Qi; ~Qj

+ @2P

~Qj ; ~Qi

+ ~Qi@
2
12P

~Qi; ~Qj

+ ~Qj@
2
12P

~Qj ; ~Qi

:
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The aggregate rst-order condition (17) implies P (QA; QB)  (c+ c^) =2 > 0. Therefore, (A:1)
and (A:3) together imply ^i < ^i < 0. We thus have
 1 < @1R^ (QB; c^) =   ^A
^A
< 0
and
@2R^ (QB; c^) =
1
^A
< 0:
Likewise, di¤erentiating (18) with respect to QA and QB yields
^BdQB + ^BdQA = 0;
and a similar reasoning leads to
 1 < R0 (QA) =   ^B
^B
< 0:
D Game  
We now consider game  , in which both rms can produce both goods A and B, but the output
levels qB1 and qA2 are exogenously xed. That is, rm 1 only decides how much of good A to
sell, qA1, and rm 2 only chooses its quantity qB2 of good B; the prot functions of rms 1 and
2 are respectively given by
^1 (qA1; qB2; q^B1; q^A2)  1 (qA1; q^B1; q^A2; qB2)
and
^2 (qA1; qB2; q^B1; q^A2)  2 (q^A2; qB2; qA1; q^B1) :
In the special case where q^A2 = q^B1 = 0, this game simplies to the di¤erentiated monoproduct-
rm Cournot duopoly studied in Subsection A.1, where each good is sold by only one rm.
To ensure that this game yields a well-behaved equilibrium, we introduce the following
assumptions:
(B:1) For any Qi; Qj  0 and for any (qi; qj) 2 [0; Qi] [0; Qj ],
2@1P (Qi; Qj) + qi@
2
11P (Qi; Qj) + qj@
2
22P (Qj ; Qi)
 @2P (Qi; Qj) + qi@212P (Qi; Qj) + qj@212P (Qj ; Qi)
 0;
with strict inequalities when P (Qi; Qj) > 0.
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(B:2) For any Qi; Qj  0 and for any qi 2 [0; Qi],
2@1P (Qi; Qj) + qi@
2
11P (Qi; Qj) +Qj@
2
22P (Qj ; Qi)
 @2P (Qi; Qj) + @2P (Qj ; Qi) + qi@212P (Qi; Qj) +Qj@212P (Qj ; Qi) ; (B.2a)
with strict inequalities when P (Qi; Qj) > 0, and in addition, for any qj 2 [0; Qj ],
@1P (Qi; Qj)
26664
2@1P (Qj ; Qi)  @2P (Qj ; Qi)
+qj
 
@211P (Qj ; Qi)  @212P (Qj ; Qi)

+qi
 
@222P (Qi; Qj)  @212P (Qi; Qj)

37775
 @2P (Qi; Qj)
26664
2@1P (Qi; Qj)  @2P (Qi; Qj)
+ [Qi   qi]
 
@211P (Qi; Qj)  @212P (Qi; Qj)

+ [Qj   qj ]
 
@222P (Qj ; Qi)  @212P (Qj ; Qi)

37775 ; (B.2b)
with strict inequalities when P (Qi; Qj) > 0 and P (Qj ; Qi) > 0.
(B:3) For any Qi; Qj  0 and for any qi 2 [0; Qi],
@1P (Qi; Qj) + qi@
2
11P (Qi; Qj) +Qj@
2
22P (Qj ; Qi) < 0: (B.3a)
with strict inequalities when P (Qi; Qj) > 0, and in addition, for any qj 2 [0; Qj ],
@2Pi + @2Pj + (Qi   qi) @212Pi + qj@212Pj

 @2Pj + (Qj   qj) @212Pj + qi@212Pi 

2@1Pi + (Qi   qi) @211Pi + qj@222Pj

 @1Pj + (Qj   qj) @211Pj + qi@222Pi ;
(B.3b)
where Pi  P (Qi; Qj) and Pj  P (Qj ; Qi), with a strict inequality when Pi > 0 and
Pj > 0.
In the case of linear demand (B:1), (B:2) and (B:3) boil down to, respectively, 2@1P <
@2P < 0, @1P < @2P and (@1P   @2P ) (2@1   @2P ) > 0, and (@2P )2 < (@1P )2; they are thus all
implied by (A:1).
The following Proposition shows that these assumptions ensure that the game   yields a
well-behaved equilibrium:
Proposition 15 We have:
 Under Assumptions (A:1) and (B:1):
( :1) Game   has a unique equilibrium.
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Let (~qA1 (q^B1; q^A2) ; ~qB2 (q^B1; q^A2)) denote the equilibrium quantities and ~i (q^B1; q^A2) de-
note rm is equilibrium prot.
 Under Assumptions (A:1) and (B:1)  (B:2):
( :2) In game  , the aggregate equilibrium prot
~ (q^B1; q^A2) = ~1 (q^B1; q^A2) + ~2 (q^B1; q^A2)
is uniquely maximized for q^B1 = q^A2 = 0; that is, ~ (0; 0) > ~ (q^B1; q^A2) whenever
q^B1 + q^A2 > 0.
 Under Assumptions (A:1) and (B:1)  (B:3):
( :3) In game  , the equilibrium quantity ~qA1 (q^A2; q^B1) (resp., ~qB2 (q^B1; q^A2)) is decreas-
ing in q^A2 (resp., q^B1), and strictly so as long as it is positive.
Proof. We rst consider property ( :1), and assume that (A:1) and (B:1) hold. The
derivative of rm is prot, ^i, with respect to qih is (for ih 6= jk 2 fA1; B2g):
(qih; qjk; q^jh; q^ik)  P (qih + q^ik; q^jh + qjk) c+qih@1P (qih + q^ik; q^jh + qjk)+q^jh@2P (q^jh + qjk; qih + q^ik) ;
and is thus such that:
d
dqih
(qih; qjk; q^jh; q^ik) = 2@1P (qik + q^il; q^jk + qjl)+qik@
2
11P (qik + q^il; q^jk + qjl)+q^jk@
2
22P (q^jk + qjl; qik + q^il) :
From (A:1),  (qih; qjk; q^jh; q^ik) = 0 implies P (qih + q^ik; q^jh + qjk)  c (> 0), and thus, from
(B:1), ddqih (qih; qjk; q^jh; q^ik) < 0; it follows that rm is best-response
r(qjk; q^B1; q^A2) = arg max
qih
^i (qA1; qB2; q^B1; q^A2)
is single-valued. It is moreover positive whenever
P (q^ik; q^jh + qjk) > c  q^jh@2P (q^jh + qjk; q^ik) ;
in which case it is characterized by the rst-order condition  (qih; qjk; q^jh; q^ik) = 0. Di¤erenti-
ating this rst-order condition with respect to qih and qjk then yields:
dr
dqjk
(qjk; q^jh; q^ik) =  i
i
; (19)
19
where
i 
2@1P (qih + q^ik; q^jh + qjk)
+qih@
2
11P (qih + q^ik; q^jh + qjk) + q^jh@
2
22P (q^jh + qjk; qih + q^ik)

qih=r(qjk;q^jh;q^ik)
;
i 
@2P (qih + q^ik; q^jh + qjk)
+qih@
2
12P (qih + q^ik; q^jh + qjk) + q^jh@
2
12P (q^jh + qjk; qih + q^ik)

qih=r(qjk;q^jh;q^ik)
:
As i < i < 0 from (B:1), (19) implies
 1 < dr
dqjk
< 0:
Hence there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, which is moreover stablein the usual sense.
We now turn to property ( :2), and assume that (A:1) and (B:1)  (B:2) hold. We consider
three steps.
 Step 1: An increase in either q^A2 or q^B1 leads to a strict increase in the total equilibrium
output ~QA + ~QB, where ~Qi denotes the total equilibrium output of good i in game  .
This is obvious (although in a weak sense, for the decreasingpart) when ~qA1 (q^B1; q^A2) =
~qB2 (q^B1; q^A2) = 0, as then ~QA = q^A2 and ~QB = q^B1. Consider now the case where ~qih (q^B1; q^A2) >
0 whereas ~qjk (q^B1; q^A2) = 0, for ih 6= jk 2 fA1; B2g. We then have ~Qj = q^jh, and thus
@ ~Qj
@q^ik
= 0;
@ ~Qj
@q^jh
= 1. Turning to ~Qi = ~qih + q^ik, the rst-order condition for ~qih is:
P (~qih + q^ik; q^jh)  c+ ~qih@1P (~qih + q^ik; q^jh) + q^jh@2P (q^jh; ~qih + q^ik) = 0; (20)
or:
P

~Qi; q^jh

  c+ ~Qi@1P

~Qi; q^jh

= q^ik@1P

~Qi; q^jh

  q^jh@2P

q^jh; ~Qi

:
Di¤erentiating this equation with respect to ~Qi and q^jk yields, using ~Qj = q^jh:
~id ~Qi = @1P

~Qi; ~Qj

dq^ik  
h
@2P

~Qj ; ~Qi

+ ~i
i
dq^jh;
where
~i = 2@1P

~Qi; ~Qj

+ ~qih@
2
11P

~Qi; ~Qj

+ ~Qj@
2
22P

~Qj ; ~Qi

;
~i = @2P

~Qi; ~Qj

+ ~qih@
2
12P

~Qi; q^jh

+ ~Qj@
2
12P

~Qj ; ~Qi

:
The rst-order condition (20) implies Pi = P

~Qi; ~Qj

 c > 0, and thus Assumptions (A:1)
and (B:2a) respectively yield @1P

~Qi; ~Qj

< @2P

~Qj ; ~Qi

< 07 and ~i < @2P

~Qj ; ~Qi

+ ~i <
7See footnote 5.
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~i < 0; therefore:
@ ~Qi
@q^ik
=
@1P

~Qi; ~Qj

~i
> 0; (21)
 1 < @
~Qi
@q^jh
=  
@2P

~Qj ; ~Qi

+ ~i
~i
< 0;
which yields:
@

~QA + ~QB

@q^ik
=
@ ~Qi
@q^ik
=
@1P

~Qi; ~Qj

~i
> 0;
@

~QA + ~QB

@q^jh
= 1 +
@ ~Qi
@q^jh
= 1 
@2P

~Qj ; ~Qi

+ ~i
~i
> 0:
Let us now consider the case where ~qA1; ~qB2 > 0, and are thus characterized by the rst-order
conditions:
P (~qA1 + q^A2; q^B1 + ~qB2)  c+ ~qA1@1P (~qA1 + q^A2; q^B1 + ~qB2) + q^B1@2P (q^B1 + ~qB2; ~qA1 + q^A2) = 0;
P (q^B1 + ~qB2; ~qA1 + q^A2)  c+ ~qB2@1P (q^B1 + ~qB2; ~qA1 + q^A2) + q^A2@2P (~qA1 + q^A2; q^B1 + ~qB2) = 0;
or, in terms of total equilibrium outputs ~QA = ~qA1 + q^A2 and ~QB = q^B1 + ~qB2:
P

~QA; ~QB

  c+ ~QA@1P

~QA; ~QB

= q^A2@1P

~QA; ~QB

  q^B1@2P

~QB; ~QA

;
P

~QB; ~QA

  c+ ~QB@1P

~QB; ~QA

= q^B1@1P

~QB; ~QA

  q^A2@2P

~QA; ~QB

;
which implies P

~Qi; ~Qj

; P

~Qj ; ~Qi

 c > 0. Furthermore, di¤erentiating these equations
with respect to

~QA; ~QB

and (q^A2; q^B1) yields:
~Ad ~QA + ~Ad ~QB = @1P

~QA; ~QB

dq^A2   @2P

~QB; ~QA

dq^B1;
~Bd ~QA +
~Bd ~QB =  @2P

~QA; ~QB

dq^A2 + @1P

~QB; ~QA

dq^B1;
where ~i and ~i are now given by (with ih 6= jk 2 fA1; B1g):
~i = 2@1P

~Qi; ~Qj

+ ~qih@
2
11P

~Qi; ~Qj

+ q^jh@
2
22P

~Qj ; ~Qi

;
~i = @2P

~Qi; ~Qj

+ ~qih@
2
12P

~Qi; ~Qj

+ q^jh@
2
12P

~Qj ; ~Qi

:
Under Assumption (B:1), these coe¢ cients satisfy ~i < ~i; the determinant D = ~A~B   ~A~B
is therefore positive, and thus:
@ ~Qi
@q^ik
=
~j@1P

~Qi; ~Qj

+ ~i@2P

~Qi; ~Qj

D
; (22)
@ ~Qj
@q^ik
=  
~j@1P

~Qi; ~Qj

+ ~i@2P

~Qi; ~Ql

D
:
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Therefore, we have:
@

~QA + ~QB

@q^ik
=

~j   ~j

@1P

~Qi; ~Qj

 

~i   ~i

@2P

~Qi; ~Qj

D
:
Assumption (B:2b) ensures that the numerator, too, is positive, which concludes the proof of
this step.
 Step 2: The aggregate prot (Q;Q) = 2[P (Q;Q)  c]Q is strictly decreasing in Q for all
Q  Q such that P (Q;Q) > 0, where Q is the equilibrium quantity of each good in the
duopoly with monoproduct rms considered in Section A.1.
This is obvious when Q is so large that P (Q;Q) = 0. When instead P (Q;Q) > 0, then the
derivative of the aggregate prot with respect to per-good output Q is
d(Q;Q)
dQ
= 2 [P (Q;Q)  c+Q@1P (Q;Q) +Q@2P (Q;Q)] :
We have:
d(Q;Q)
dQ

Q=Q
= 2Q@2P (Q; Q) < 0;
where the inequality stems from (A:1). In addition:
1
2
d2(Q;Q)
dQ2
=
d
dQ
[P (Q;Q)  c+Q@1P (Q;Q) +Q@2P (Q;Q)]
= [2@1P (Q;Q) +Q@11P (Q;Q) +Q@22P (Q;Q)]
+

@2P (Q;Q) +Q
 
@212P (Q;Q) + @
2
12P (Q;Q)

+ @2P (Q;Q);
where the last term is negative from (A:1) and the two terms in brackets are negative from
(B:1). Hence d2(Q;Q)=dQ2 < 0, and thus d(Q;Q)=dQ < 0 for Q  Q.
 Step 3. For any xed level of aggregate output QA + QB = 2Q, the aggregate prot
(QA; QB) = [P (QA; QB)  c]QA + [P (QB; QA)  c]QB is maximal for QA = QB = Q.
Let us x the total output QA + QB = 2Q, and consider the impact of a variation in Qi
(thus compensated by a mirror variation in Qj , for i 6= j 2 fA;Bg). The aggregate prot being
symmetric in QA and QB, its derivative with respect to Qi, holding QA + QB xed, can be
expressed as
d(QA; QB)
dQi

QA+QB=2Q
= 	(Qi; Qj) 	(Qj ; Qi); (23)
where
	(Qi; Qj)  @(Qi; Qj)
@Qi
= P (Qi; Qj)  c+Qi@1P (Qi; Qj) +Qj@2P (Qj ; Qi):
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The RHS of (23) is equal to zero when QA = QB = Q; we now show that it is never positive
when Qi > Qj . To see this, consider the derivative of 	 with respect to Qi, holding QA + QB
xed:
d	(Qi; Qj)
dQi

QA+QB=2Q
=
@	(Qi; Qj)
@Qi
  @	(Qi; Qj)
@Qj
= 2@1P (Qi; Qj) +Qi@
2
11P (Qi; Qj) +Q
2
j@
2
12P (Qj ; Qi)
  @2P (Qi; Qj) + @2P (Qj ; Qi) +Qi@212P (Qi; Qj) +Qj@212P (Qj ; Qi)
 0;
where the inequality follows from (B:2a). Hence, if Qi > Q =
QA+QB
2 > Qj , then 	(Qi; Qj) 
	(Q;Q)  	(Qj ; Qi), implying that (23) is never positive; it follows that, keeping total output
QA +QB = 2Q constant, the aggregate prot (QA; QB) is maximal for QA = QB = Q.
Steps 2 and 3 together imply that (QA; QB) < (Q; Q) whenever QA + QB > 2Q;
property ( :2) then follows from step 1.
Finally, we consider property ( :3), and assume that (A:1) (A:2) and (B:1)  (B:3) hold.
By symmetry, it su¢ ces to show that, say, @ ~QB=@q^B1  1. This is obvious when ~qB2 = 0,
as then ~QB = q^B1. Consider now the case where ~qB2 > 0 which, as already noted, implies
P

~QB; ~QA

 c > 0. If ~qA1 = 0, so that ~QA = q^A2, then from (21):
@ ~QB
@q^B1
=
@1P

~QB; ~QA

~B
:
Assumptions (A:1) and (B:3a) together imply ~B < @1P

~QB; ~QA

< 0, and thus @ ~QB=@q^B1 <
1.
When instead ~qA1 > 0, then from (22):
@ ~QB
@q^B1
=
~A@1P

~QB; ~QA

+ ~BA@2P

~QB; ~QA

D
;
where D > 0 under Assumption (B:1). It follows that this expression is less than one if and only
if D > ~A@1P

~QB; ~QA

+ ~BA@2P

~QB; ~QA

; this amounts to:h
@2PA + @2PB +

~QA   q^A2

@212PA + q^B1@
2
12PB
i

h
@2PB +

~QB   q^B1

@212PB + q^A2@
2
12PA
i
<
h
2@1PA +

~QA   q^A2

@211PA + q^B1@
2
22PB
i

h
@1PB +

~QB   q^B1

@211PB + q^A2@
2
22PA
i
;
which holds under Assumption (B:3b) (for (i; j) = (A;B) and (qi; qj) = (q^A2; q^B1)).
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